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ABSTRACT	
The	aim	of	this	study	is	to	(a)	compare	and	contrast	a	number	of	theoretical	
approaches	to	the	study	of	terrorism	in	order	to	clearly	define	what	constitutes	a	
terrorist	act,	(b)	analyze	various	arguments	for	the	moral	justification	of	terrorism,	
and	(c)	provide	a	detailed	historical	analysis	of	the	actions	of	the	Weather	
Underground	Organization	(WUO)	to	determine	whether	or	not	the	group’s	actions	
should	be	considered	terrorism.	In	so	doing,	this	study	demonstrates	that	the	actions	of	
the	WUO	throughout	the	late	1960s	do	not	constitute	terrorism;	however,	if	they	do,	
they	could	be	considered	morally	just.	This	case	study	sheds	light	on	the	sociopolitical	
dynamics	that	have	historically	motivated	groups	to	take	up	armed	struggle	against	
their	own	government,	offering	new	insights	for	the	sociological	study	of	terrorism,	a	
discipline	in	its	infancy. 
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INTRODUCTION	The	Weather	Underground	Organization	was	a	product	of	its	time.	It	exemplified	young	revolutionary	sentiment	that	was	able	to	grow	into	something	more.	There	were	many	radical	youth	movements	of	the	late	1960s,	but	none	set	out	to	accomplish	what	the	Weathermen	tried	to:	a	violent	overthrow	of	the	United	States	government,	one	that	would	replace	American	capitalism	with	a	communist	system.	America	in	the	1960s	had	seen	cultural	revolution	like	no	decade	before	it,	complete	with	the	rise	of	the	hippie	counterculture.	By	the	end	of	the	1960s,	the	conflict	in	Vietnam	was	at	its	height,	with	more	than	one-half	million	American	troops	on	the	ground	in	mid-1968.	The	riots	at	the	1968	Democratic	National	Convention	highlighted	political	divisions	that	Americans	had	continually	tried	to	sweep	under	the	rug.	Organizations	like	the	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS)	and	the	National	Mobilization	Committee	to	End	the	War	in	Vietnam	(MOBE)	sought	out	new	ways	to	demonstrate	the	outrage	of	college-aged	youth	with	the	current	political	system	and	the	Vietnam	Conflict.	The	Vietnam	Conflict,	the	Civil	Rights	Movement,	and	the	expansion	of	youth	education	and	globalization	all	worked	together	to	create	a	perfect	storm	in	which	radical	youth	culture	emerged.	
Political	and	Social	Turmoil	in	the	US	Vietnam	was	originally	a	French	colony,	taken	over	as	a	part	of	French	Indochina	in	1887.	After	the	Second	World	War	the	Vietnamese	began	a	revolution	for	independence	from	French	imperialism	that	seemed	accomplished	in	1954	when	France	removed	itself	from	the	country,	essentially	giving	up	on	fighting	the	
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Vietnamese	people	in	their	own	land.	After	this,	the	country	was	run	by	a	series	of	westernized	leaders,	many	of	whom	were	put	in	place	through	fraudulent	elections	thanks	to	their	ties	with	western	leaders.	When	John	F.	Kennedy	(JFK)	was	elected	in	1960,	Vietnam’s	leader	was	Ngo	Dinh	Diem,	a	South	Vietnamese	politician.	Ho	Chi	Minh	was	another	leader	after	the	French-defeat.	The	communist	visionary	emerged	to	lead	the	armed	struggle	against	democratic	Vietnam.	He	rose	to	power	in	North	Vietnam	after	the	Second	World	War.	He	had	been	educated	in	France,	and	before	returning	to	Vietnam	in	1941,	spent	time	in	both	China	and	the	Soviet	Union,	learning	about	communism.	When	he	did	return	to	Vietnam,	he	took	the	opportunity	to	break	away	from	France	and	lead	the	Viet	Minh	revolt	against	the	French.	When	the	French	were	defeated	in	1954,	Ho	Chi	Minh	moved	the	communist	capital	to	Hanoi	in	North	Vietnam,	proclaiming	it	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Vietnam,	creating	a	one-party	Viet	Minh	state.	Pro-Western	leaders	controlled	South	Vietnam,	while	Ho	Chi	Minh	held	the	North,	a	system	that	could	not	last,	due	to	widespread	popular	support	for	the	Viet	Minh.	After	much	public	unrest	in	1963,	Diem	was	overthrown	and	assassinated	by	the	Viet	Minh	on	1	November,	weeks	before	the	assassination	of	JFK.	After	this,	civil	war	broke	out	in	Vietnam.	Seeing	this	develop	during	the	early	years	of	his	presidency,	JFK	had	already	made	the	decision	to	deploy	American	troops	before	his	assassination.	American	involvement	continued	during	Lyndon	B.	Johnson’s	presidency	and	later	under	Richard	Nixon	and	Gerald	Ford,	lasting	until	1975.	Fearing	the	spread	of	communism	to	the	western	world	(commonly	known	as	the	“Domino	Effect”),	he	felt	that	the	defense	of	Southern	Vietnam	was	the	only	way	to	ensure	that	this	did	not	happen,	seeing	as	it	would,	in	his	eyes,	be	a	quick	victory	for	
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Americans	and	democracy.	Thus,	Americans	became	involved	in	a	conflict	from	which	it	was	unable	to	extract	itself	for	over	a	decade.1		By	mid-1968,	there	were	536,100	US	troops	on	the	ground	in	Vietnam,	far	more	than	ever	expected	or	promised	by	the	US.2	This	number	did	not	get	any	higher,	as	the	Nixon	Administration	made	the	decision	in	1969	to	reduce	the	number	of	new	troops	being	sent.	At	the	end	of	1969,	only	485,600	troops	were	deployed.3	However,	this	was	still	a	significant	number	of	Americans	being	placed	in	the	small,	southeastern	Asian	country,	with	little	knowledge	on	how	to	deal	with	the	rough	terrain	and	the	guerilla	style	warfare	that	so	many	troops	had	already	faced	in	years	prior.	By	the	end	of	the	1960s,	a	large	portion	of	the	American	public	was	not	in	favor	of	continued	American	involvement	in	Vietnam.		The	rise	of	the	counterculture	in	the	mid-1960s	and	the	education	of	the	‘Baby	Boomer’	generation,	who	were	now	college-aged,	created	a	sociocultural	and	popular	cultural	revolution	in	America.	New	fashion,	music,	and	ways	of	thinking	were	introduced	into	the	lives	of	mainstream	youth,	exacerbating	an	ever-growing	generational	divide	between	parents	and	their	children.	Young	adults,	between	the	ages	of	sixteen	and	twenty-five	could	be	seen	wearing	new	trends	like	fringe,	the	mini	skirt,	and	second-hand	clothing,	sometimes	even	from	military	surplus	stores.	They	could	also	be	seen	listening	to	rock	n’	roll.	The	British	Invasion	of	the	Beatles	in	1964	marked	a	new	era	of	popular	music,	one	that	moved	away	from	the	teddy-
                                               
1 This	military	engagement	is	referred	to	by	the	Vietnamese	as	the	American	War;	however,	this	study	will	refer	to	it	as	the	Vietnam	Conflict,	since	war	on	North	Vietnam	was	never	technically	declared	by	the	US	Congress. 2	Vietnam	War	Allied	Troop	Levels,	1960-1973.	Accessed	November	09,	2017.	http://www.americanwarlibrary,com/vwatl.htm.	
3 Vietnam	War	Allied	Troop	Levels,	1960-1973. 
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boy	pop-rock	of	the	early	1960s	and	slowly	became	faster	and	rougher.	Stemming	from	folk	and	folk-rock,	which	had	been	once	again	popularized	by	singers	like	Bob	Dylan	and	Joan	Baez,	rock	n’	roll	became	more	and	more	politicalized	during	the	mid-to-late	1960s,	with	artists	like	Jimi	Hendrix,	Jefferson	Airplane,	and	even	the	Beatles	singing	anti-war	and	anti-Vietnam	protest	songs.	One	could	not	hide	from	the	political	discontent	in	America.	It	was	everywhere.		New	ways	of	thinking	and	living	emerged	from	higher	numbers	of	young	adults	attending	college.	Sit-ins	and	be-ins	were	held	on	college-campuses	throughout	the	latter	half	of	the	1960s,	peaceful	and	educated	discussions	about	popular	topics	like	the	Vietnam	Conflict,	American	imperialism,	democracy	and	communism,	and	even	radical	ideas	like	communal	living	and	self-sustaining	communities.	Many	of	these	talks	were	organized	by	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS),	in	an	effort	to	create	political	consciousness	in	the	youth	of	America,	giving	those	involved	a	feeling	that	they	had	a	voice.	This	was	especially	important	to	minority	groups,	such	as	those	who	were	involved	in	the	Women's	Liberation	Movement,	the	Gay	Rights	Movement,	and	especially,	the	Civil	Rights	Movement,	which	saw	victories	in	1964	and	1968	with	both	the	Civil	Rights	Acts	and	through	the	work	of	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.	(MLK)	and	Malcolm	X.	After	both	these	African-American	leaders	were	assassinated,	the	Black	Liberation	Movement	and	groups	like	the	Black	Panthers	took	on	a	stronger	approach	with	radical	Black	Nationalism.	Until	the	late	1970s,	these	movements	were	increasingly	infiltrated	by	the	FBI,	whose	goal	was	to	dismantle	any	possible	groups	opposing	the	government.	This	FBI	method	of	operation	meant	that	the	Weathermen	would	appear	on	the	FBI’s	list	at	the	moment	of	their	creation.	
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The	Weather	Underground	The	Weathermen	were	a	subgroup	of	the	youth	culture	that	broke	away	from	their	mother	organization	of	SDS	in	June	of	1969	in	an	effort	to	recruit	working-class	Americans.	Made	up	of	mostly	middle-class,	college-educated,	white	Americans,	its	stated	goal	was	the	violent	overthrow	of	the	United	States	government,	toppling	American	imperialism	and	capitalism,	and	replacing	it	with	a	communist	system.	Between	the	years	1970-1976	the	group	was	responsible	for	about	a	dozen	symbolic	bombings	across	the	country,	bombings	that	would	blow	up	locations	that	represented	the	government	they	strongly	opposed,	while	killing	no	one.	During	this	time,	leading	members	of	the	Weathermen	lived	underground,	off	the	radar	of	the	FBI,	which	put	many	of	them	on	the	Top	Ten	Most	Wanted	list.	At	the	end	of	the	1970s,	most	of	the	membership	resurfaced	and	returned	to	normal	life	with	hardly	any	legal	consequences.		
The	Weather	Underground	and	Terrorism	Theory	When	it	comes	to	the	Weathermen,	this	study	seeks	to	consider	one	main	research	question,	one	that	is	based	on	a	debate	that	has	existed	since	the	group’s	conception:	is	it	accurate	to	refer	to	the	Weathermen	as	a	terrorist	organization?	Do	the	group’s	actions	warrant	a	label	as	striking	and	stigma-producing	as	the	term	“terrorist”?	This	work	will	first	review	scholarly	research	and	data	to	develop	criteria	by	which	a	group	may	or	may	not	then	be	labeled	as	such.	Terrorism	theory	is	quite	young,	with	only	a	small	portion	of	researched	knowledge	gathered	on	the	conceptualization	of	terrorism.	Until	11	September,	
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2001,	sociologists	had	given	little	effort	to	the	conceptualization	and	study	of	terrorism.	To	this	day,	clear	definitions	of	the	term	“terrorism”	are	“controversial	for	reasons	other	than	conceptual	issues	and	problems.	As	labeling	actions	as	‘terrorism’	promotes	condemnation	of	the	actors,	a	definition	may	reflect	ideological	or	political	bias.”4	This	makes	the	ability	to	categorize	groups	that	are	referred	to	as	terrorist	quite	difficult.	Therefore,	this	study	must	first	create	a	clearer	conceptualization	and	develop	criteria	before	it	can	be	applied	to	the	situation	of	the	Weathermen.	Philosopher	C.A.J.	Coady	argues	that	the	first	step	to	understanding	terrorism	and	terrorist	actions	is	defining	it	correctly.	Rather	than	describing	terrorism	as	an	ideology	in	and	of	itself,	terrorism	should	be	seen	as	“no	more	than	[as]	the	relatively	systematic	nature	of	a	method	or	tactic.”5	Coady	explains	that	“the	tendency	to	think	of	terrorism	as	an	ideology	is	no	doubt	encouraged	by	superficial	verbal	resemblances—so	many	expressions	ending	in	‘-ism’	are	words	for	ideologies	or	systems	of	belief.”6	However,	terrorism	is	not	something	that	can	simply	be	an	ideology	on	its	own.		Coady	also	says	that	a	“distinctive	point	of	terrorism…	is	to	terrorize,	to	spread	fear	and	so	destabilize	social	relations.”7	It	is	the	idea	that	through	the	deterioration	of	social	relations,	i.e.,	the	creation	of	clear	and	rigid	social	divisions	in	a	society,	there	can	rise	a	new	order	in	society,	one	that	favors	whatever	group	is	committing	the	violent	actions.	
                                               4	Jack	P.	Gibbs.	"Conceptualization	of	Terrorism."	American	Sociological	Review	54,	no.	3	(1989),	329.	5	C.	A.	J.	Coady.	"The	Morality	of	Terrorism."	Philosophy	60,	no.	231	(1985),	47.	6	Coady,	“Morality	of	Terrorism,”	47.	7	Coady,	“Morality	of	Terrorism,”	53.	
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Another	requirement	for	an	act	to	be	categorized	as	terrorism	is	the	idea	that	it	is	the	use	of	or	threat	of	violence	on	non-combatant	citizens	to	accomplish	some	goal.	Along	with	deeming	terrorism	a	tactic,	Coady	(as	well	as	many	other	theorists)	argue	that	terrorists	are	defined	by	their	decision	to	“choose	to	attack	non-combatants.”8	This	is	a	part	of	the	criteria	of	terrorism	that	appears	in	most	scholarly	research.	The	use	of	violence	or	threat	of	violence	on	non-combatant	citizens	is	the	“crucial	definitional	feature”	of	conceptualizing	terrorism.9	Theorist	J.	Angelo	Corlett’s	definition	of	terrorism	is	similar,	stating	that	it	must	be	connected	to	threatening	or	using	violence	against	citizens.	He	explains	that	one	of	terrorism’s	“primary	intentions	[is]	to	harm	noncombatants”	to	serve	a	political	purpose.	10	By	making	the	target	innocent	civilians,	terrorism	becomes	a	tactic	that	can	be	stigmatized	and	demonized.	Those	who	witness	terrorist	actions	can	then	resort	to	calling	those	who	commit	the	violent	actions	“monsters”	or	“devils,”	because	who	else	would	act	in	such	a	way	towards	those	who	do	not	deserve	deliberate	and	intentional	pain	and	suffering?	Corlett	insinuates	that	it	is	much	more	difficult	to	define	an	action	as	terroristic	in	nature	if	the	violence	or	threat	of	violence	is	only	directed	towards	“those	guilty	of	injustice.”11	Austin	T.	Turk,	a	sociologist,	would	agree	with	Corlett’s	definition	of	terrorism	in	that	it	is	essential	to	include	the	idea	that	terrorism	targets	noncombatants.	He	argues	that	“terrorism	differs	from	ordinary	crime	in	that	it	targets	a	population,	applying	the	standard	of	collective	
                                               8	Coady,	“Morality	of	Terrorism,”	53.	9	Coady,	“Morality	of	Terrorism,”	54.	10	Angelo	J.	Corlett.	“Can	Terrorism	Be	Morally	Justified?”	Public	Affairs	Quarterly	10,	no.	3	(1996),	165.	11	Corlett,	“Can	Terrorism	Be	Morally	Justified?,”	170.	
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liability	for	perceived	violations	of	normative	expectations.”12	This	means	that	those	who	commit	terrorist	actions	find	innocent	noncombatants	to	be	in	fact	guilty,	using	the	simple	reasoning	that	they	are	not	fighting	the	system	they	are	a	part	of,	and	therefore,	silently	condoning	it.	Despite	this	belief	on	the	part	of	terrorist	actors,	innocent	civilians	are	just	that,	innocent.	They	do	not	warrant	any	violence	or	threat	of	violence	that	is	thrust	upon	them	by	terrorists	seeking	out	a	specific	goal.	Turk	also	makes	note	of	another	requirement	for	the	conceptualization	of	terrorism:	its	goal	or	purpose.	He	finds	that	“waves	of	terrorist	activity	are	associated	with	cycles	of	political	economic	deterioration	and	replacement	by	new	forms	of	political	order.”13	What	makes	violent	actors	terrorists	is	that	they	have	a	political	motivation	of	some	kind.	Terrorism	and	political	goals	go	hand-in-hand.	Those	who	commit	acts	of	terror	or	threaten	to	use	acts	of	terror	on	civilians	do	so	to	advance	a	political	goal.	Along	with	this	political	aspect,	is	how	terrorist	organizations	are	created.	Sociological	theorists	on	terror	Colin	J.	Beck	and	Emily	Miner	explain	that	terrorism	is	socially	constructed	with	a	political	motive.	They	state	that	terrorism	is	something	that	is	“socially	constructed…	based	off	of	more	than	just	assessments	of	actual	risk.”14	They	are	human	beings	with	a	background	and	reasons	why	they	decide	to	participate	in	actions	of	violence	or	threaten	actions	of	violence	on	civilians.	However,	the	terrorist	is	socially	created	through	their	own	personal	socialization	into	a	culture	in	which	they	live,	and	this	then	makes	them	radicalized	and	willing	to	
                                               12	Austin	T.	Turk.	"Sociology	of	Terrorism."	Annual	Review	of	Sociology	30	(2004),	285.	13	Turk,	“Sociology	of	Terrorism,”	283.	14	Colin	J.	Beck	and	Emily	Miner.	"Who	Gets	Designated	a	Terrorist	and	Why?"	Social	Forces	91,	no.	3	(2013),	839.	
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commit	violent	acts	on	non-combatants	in	order	to	push	a	political	agenda	of	some	kind.	Beck	and	Miner	would	also	agree	that	terrorism	can	only	be	defined	as	such	if	it	targets	innocent	civilians,	rather	than	just	anyone	or	anything.15	Disagreeing	with	this	necessary	component	of	the	definition	of	terrorism	would	be	Sociologist	Jack	P.	Gibbs.	Gibbs	defines	terrorism	as	“illegal	violence	or	threatened	violence	directed	against	human	or	nonhuman	objects.”16	This	differs	from	what	Coady,	Corlett,	Turk,	and	Beck	and	Miner	all	argue,	that	it	is	only	the	targeting	of	human	civilians,	rather	than	including	non-human	objects.	However,	Gibbs	later	contradicts	himself	by	relating	to	terrorism	as	simply	“inculcating	fear	of	violence	in	persons.”17	Because,	after	all,	one	cannot	induce	fear	into	something	that	is	not	alive	and	therefore,	cannot	fear	or	feel	pain	from	violence.	From	all	of	this	scholarly	work,	it	seems	that	a	clear	definition	and	criteria	of	terrorism	can	be	created.	Terrorism	is	the	use	of	violence	or	threat	of	violence	to	induce	fear	in	non-combatant	civilians	in	order	to	promote	a	political	agenda.	This	means	that	all	of	the	elements	of	the	definition	need	to	be	present	in	order	for	something	to	qualify	as	terrorism.	It	is	a	(a)	tactic	that	is	(b)	constructed	through	actors’	own	socialization.	There	also	needs	to	be	(c)	the	threat	or	use	of	violence	to	
(d)	induce	fear	on	(e)	non-combatant	civilians	in	order	to	(f)	advance	the	political	views	that	are	held	by	those	involved.	Now	that	there	is	a	clear	set	of	criteria	usable	for	this	study,	the	following	question	can	be	asked:	if	an	action	can	be	categorized	as	terrorism,	is	there	any	way	
                                               15	Beck	&	Miner,	“Who	Gets	Designated	a	Terrorist	and	Why?,”	838.	16	Gibbs,	“Conceptualization	of	Terrorism,”	330.	17	Gibbs,	“Conceptualization	of	Terrorism,”	330.	
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that	it	can	be	morally	justified?	Corlett	argues	that	in	certain	situations,	under	certain	circumstances,	activities	that	are	defined	as	terroristic	in	nature	may	be	morally	justified.	He	explains	that	“one	is	morally	justified…	[when]	engaging	in	terrorist	activity	when:	(1)	one	is	defending	oneself;	(2)	one	is	selective	whenever	possible;	and	(3)	one	directs	terrorist	activity	only	against	those	guilty	of	injustice.”18		Another	basis	for	arguing	that	terrorism	has	moral	justification	is	the	“beauty	is	in	the	eye	of	the	beholder”	idea.	Those	who	want	to	see	a	terrorist	group	succeed,	or	may	even	be	backing	it	in	some	way,	find	ways	to	morally	justify	the	actions	of	those	terrorists,	often	referring	to	them	as	“freedom	fighters.”	On	the	other	hand,	those	who	oppose	the	actions	of	the	terrorist	group	in	question	would	call	them	just	that,	terrorists,	because	of	the	negative	connotations	that	the	term	implies.	Beck	and	Miner	mention	this	method	of	labeling	“terrorists”	and	“freedom	fighters”	by	explaining	that	“a	government’s	relations	with	a	militant	organization’s	home	country	could	thus	influence	designation”	of	what	they	consider	terrorist	or	non-terrorist	action.19	They	go	on	to	give	the	example	of	“the	American	War	on	Terror,”	arguing	that	it	has	been	“a	cover	for	naked	global	strategic	interests,	such	as	an	attempt	to	preserve	and	extend	US	hegemony,	serve	capitalist	economic	interests	and	maintain	control	of	crucial	resources.”20	This	is	why	there	is	still	a	debate	on	a	clear	definition	of	terrorism	today,	because	of	countries’	inability	to	separate	their	own	state	interests	from	legitimate	labeling.	However,	this	method	of	labeling	is	
                                               18	Corlett,	“Can	Terrorism	Be	Morally	Justified?,”	170.	19	Beck	&	Miner,	“Who	Gets	Designated	a	Terrorist	and	Why?,”	838.	20	Beck	&	Miner,	“Who	Gets	Designated	a	Terrorist	and	Why?,”	838.	
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incorrect.	Countries	that	use	this	method	only	confuse	others	who	wish	to	correctly	categorize	a	violent	organization	with	a	clear	definition.	The	“beauty	is	in	the	eye	of	the	beholder”	or	“one	man’s	terrorist	is	another’s	freedom	fighter”	argument	for	moral	justification	cannot	be	accepted	as	valid.	This	means	that	the	only	acceptable	criteria	for	the	moral	justification	of	terrorism	would	be	based	on	Corlett’s	categorization:	that	terrorism	is	morally	justified	when	it	is	(1)	in	self-defense,	(2)	only	violent	when	absolutely	necessary,	and	(3)	used	against	those	who	are	guilty	of	an	injustice.		 In	this	study,	I	plan	to	examine	the	acts	of	the	Weathermen	in	the	1960s	and	1970s	through	the	lens	of	this	theoretical	discussion.	Based	upon	the	criteria	listed	above,	I	will	study	the	actions	of	the	Weather	Underground	Organization	to	see	if	they	can	be	considered	terrorism.	This	includes	considering	whether	the	members	of	the	Weathermen	should	or	should	not	be	considered	terrorists,	thereby	making	them	technically	free	of	such	a	stigma.	However,	if	after	this	examination	the	Weathermen	are	considered	terrorists	and	the	Weather	Underground	Organization	a	terrorist	group,	their	actions	may	be	considered	morally	justified	based	upon	the	criteria	laid	out	above.	This	study	will	invoke	a	complete	examination	and	analysis	of	the	history	of	the	Weathermen.	Through	this	analysis,	one	will	be	able	to	understand	why	the	motivations	of	groups	that	take	on	the	idea	of	armed	struggle	against	a	government	or	society	are	important,	and	possibly	validated.		 	
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	 CHAPTER	ONE	THE	TIMES	THEY	ARE	A’-CHANGIN’:	EARLY	SDS	AND	THE	ORIGINS	OF	THE	WEATHERMEN	
Early	SDS	In	1960,	a	group	of	radical	students	started	the	Student	League	for	Industrial	Democracy	(SLID).	Comprised	of	local,	politically	left-leaning	students,	the	Michigan-based	organization	was	very	small.	Its	goals	were	different	than	previous	college-based	groups,	created	as	a	“non-partisan	educational	organization,”	which	sought,	“to	promote	greater	active	participation	on	the	part	of	American	students.”21	Through	campus	visits	and	sit-in	teachings,	SLID	sought	to	raise	the	political	consciousness	of	college	students.	Unfortunately,	their	work	did	not	gain	the	type	of	popular	attention	that	they	desired,	and	the	leaders	of	SLID	were	forced	to	approach	their	goals	from	a	new	angle.	In	1962,	the	organization	officially	changed	its	name	to	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS).	Under	this	new	title,	the	group’s	leadership	created	a	manifesto	entitled	the	Port	Huron	Statement,	which	was	completed	15	June,	1962.	Mostly	constructed	and	edited	by	Tom	Hayden,	one	of	the	founders	of	SLID,	the	statement	“offered	a	blueprint	for	a	new	‘participatory	democracy,’	and	[was]	the	closest	thing	the	New	Left	in	America	ever	had	to	a	formal	statement	of	intent.”22	It	summed	up	the	goals	of	the	organization:	to	increase	the	political	knowledge	of	
                                               21	Kirkpatrick	Sale,	SDS	(New	York:	Random	House,	1973),	15.	22	Charles	Kaiser,	1968	in	America:	Music,	Politics,	Chaos,	Counterculture,	and	the	Shaping	of	a	
Generation	(New	York:	Grove	Press,	1988),	154.	
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American	students	and	encourage	participation,	especially	in	support	of	a	more	modern	Marxist	ideology.	More	than	65	pages	long,	the	Port	Huron	Statement	argued	for	the	legitimacy	of	SDS,	a	point	that	was	particularly	important	for	the	leadership,	as	many	had	personally	witnessed	the	decline	of	SLID.	The	document	explicitly	cited	Karl	Marx,	pairing	political	philosophy	with	colloquial	language	that	spoke	to	the	role	of	the	working-class	college	student.	Its	somewhat	laid-back	tone	and	everyday	vocabulary	exemplified	the	group’s	belief	that	no	matter	one’s	socioeconomic	background,	every	student	in	America	could	become	politically	conscious	and	involved	in	the	political	dialogue	of	their	time.			Further,	the	manifesto	drew	parallels	between	the	Marxist	proletariat	and	college	youth,	encouraging	students	to	join	together	in	support	of	working-class	citizens.		The	document	stressed	the	importance	of	idealism	in	the	face	of	the	theoretic	chaos	that	had	come	to	dominate	the	social	and	political	conversation	of	the	time.23	In	the	group’s	opinion,	the	overall	negativity	of	the	American	public	would	lead	to	the	nation’s	downfall.	SDS	desired	to	promote	a	strong	yet	peaceful	left-wing,	socialist	agenda	that	would	bring	hope	and	positivity	back	to	a	country	that	now	faced	a	looming	threat	of	nuclear	war	with	the	Soviet	Union.	Although	the	Port	Huron	Statement	expressed	a	disagreement	with	the	Soviet	Union	of	the	1960s,	its	authors	saw	Marx	as	a	visionary	and	described	the	frustration	that	college-aged	youth	had	with	American	anti-communist	paranoia.	Throughout	the	manifesto,	the	
                                               23	[“Original	Draft,	1962	Port	Huron	Statement”],	Links	to	Resources	from	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS)	and	Related	Groups	and	Activities,	accessed	December	22,	2017,	http://www.sds-1960s.org/PortHuronStatement-draft.htm.	
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leaders	of	SDS	emphasized	the	group’s	aspiration	to	awaken	college	students	to	the	power	that	they	could	bring	when	acting	in	great	numbers.		From	the	years	1962-1965,	SDS	grew	almost	synchronously	with	America’s	involvement	in	the	Vietnam	Conflict.	Membership	rose	rapidly,	from	only	nine	on-campus	chapters	(less	than	1000	members)	at	the	beginning	of	1962,	to	fifty-two	on-campus	chapters	in	1965,	with	membership	in	the	mid-thousands.	Students	at	colleges	across	the	country	began	to	form	chapters,	holding	meetings	where	students	could	discuss	politics	with	their	peers	outside	of	the	classroom.	The	drastic	increase	in	membership	during	the	period	of	1962-1965	can	be	largely	attributed	to	the	fact	that	college	students	were	drawn	to	the	Port	Huron	Statement,	agreeing	that	because	America	seemed	to	be	in	a	national	stalemate,	it	desperately	needed	leadership,	and	that	the	nation’s	“goals	were	‘ambiguous	and	tradition-bound	instead	of	informed	and	clear,	its	democratic	system	apathetic	and	manipulated	rather	than	‘of,	by,	and	for	the	people.’”24	After	all,	it	was	overwhelmingly	college	students	and	youth	from	as	young	as	sixteen	years	old,	to	anywhere	between	twenty-five	and	thirty,	who	were	being	sent	off	to	fight	a	conflict	in	Vietnam	that	they	did	not	understand,	let	alone	have	any	say	in.	SDS	offices	across	the	country	soon	became	loud	and	busy	places,	bustling	with	energy	and	constantly	organizing	events	for	this	and	that	and	peaceful	discussions	on	hot-button	political	topics	like	civil	rights	and	the	conflict	in	Vietnam.		By	1965,	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	was	fully	developed.	Springing	up	on	most	of	the	liberal-leaning	campuses	in	
                                               24	David	Barber,	A	Hard	Rain	Fell:	SDS	and	Why	it	Failed	(University	Press	of	Mississippi,	2008),	54.	
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America	and	even	on	some	that	historically	were	considered	conservative,	SDS	created	a	political	discussion	that	gained	media	attention.	Then,	in	April	of	1967,	large-scale	on-campus	demonstrations	organized	by	SDS	began	to	arise,	the	first	being	held	at	Columbia	University.	The	year	1967	was	the	most	active	year	for	SDS	yet,	with	membership	still	growing	steadily.	The	rising	Vietnam	draft	rate	and	the	prolonged	duration	of	the	conflict	proved	to	be	catalysts	for	the	group’s	actions.	Information	on	SDS	and	their	message	became	widely	available	to	all	classes	of	Americans,	and	their	self-described	idealistic	aim	to	end	the	war	in	Vietnam	through	the	power	of	political	awareness	and	student	organizing	began	to	penetrate	the	public	dialogue.	SDS	protests	now	began	to	make	a	mark	not	only	on	college	campuses,	but	also	in	major	cities.			With	the	success	of	growing	membership	and	activism	during	1967,	SDS	began	to	get	more	media	coverage.	Even	though	not	all	of	this	media	attention	was	positive,	SDS	benefited	from	an	ever-growing	presence	in	the	eyes	and	ears	of	the	American	public.	In	March	of	1968,	the	SDS	Columbia	Chapter	held	an	event	that	would	become	one	of	the	most	notable	anti-Vietnam	student	demonstrations	of	all	time.	Led	by	Columbia	students	and	SDS	members	Ted	Gold,	John	Jacobs	(J.J.),	and	Mark	Rudd,	SDS	organized	an	on-campus	anti-Vietnam	Conflict	demonstration	that	drew	thousands.	The	students	occupied	several	campus	buildings	including	the	college’s	ROTC	building,	and	disrupted	classes	for	days,	effectively	shutting	down	the	University.	This	protest	signaled	a	new	high	point	of	activity	for	the	organization.	The	takeover	of	a	relatively	conservative	Ivy-League	college	showed	that	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	was	capable	of	generating	more	than	just	
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campus	conversation,	affecting	public	dialogue	on	the	legitimacy	of	the	Vietnam	Conflict.		The	events	at	Columbia	were	the	“most	significant	student	rebellion	to	date.”25	One	could	argue	that	the	student	youth	of	America,	drawn	by	the	excitement	and	promise	of	this	event,	flocked	to	SDS.	The	organization	now	turned	its	attention	toward	an	even	larger	political	and	social	scale,	aiming	to	enact	change	at	an	increasingly	national	level.	The	1968	Democratic	National	Convention	in	Chicago,	26-29	of	August,	proved	to	be	the	perfect	venue	for	their	next	major	demonstration.	Although	only	about	500	members	of	SDS	were	in	Chicago	in	the	name	of	the	organization,	roughly	2,000	of	the	4,000	attendees	were	members	of	the	group	in	some	capacity,	many	belonging	to	different	splinter	groups	with	their	own	more	specific	aims.	One	such	splinter	group,	the	Mobilization	Committee	to	End	the	War	in	Vietnam	(MOBE),	led	by	Tom	Hayden,	one	of	the	founders	of	SDS,	camped	out	that	week	in	Grant	Park	across	from	the	Chicago	Hilton,	the	hotel	that	housed	the	Democratic	delegates.	Another	splinter	group,	the	Youth	International	Party	(YIP	or	the	Yippies),	led	by	SDS	members	Abbie	Hoffman	and	Jerry	Rubin,	set	up	in	Lincoln	Park.		 Three	days	into	the	convention	on	28	August,	the	two	groups	merged.	Mayor	Daley	called	in	the	Illinois	National	Guard	and	the	Chicago	Police	Department	to	control	the	now	immense	mob	of	protesters	inhabiting	the	parks.	This	choice	would	prove	disastrous,	as	police	officers	and	National	Guard	members	descended	upon	the	crowd,	inciting	a	riot.	The	spectacle	was	beamed	into	the	homes	of	millions	of	
                                               25	Sale,	SDS,	441.	
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Americans	across	the	country	by	the	television	crews	and	reporters	that	were	sent	to	cover	the	convention.	The	entire	country	watched	as	members	of	the	Chicago	PD	viciously	attacked	protesters	in	the	streets,	generating	chaos	among	anti-war	and	pro-war	organizers	alike.	The	leaders	of	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	could	not	have	hoped	for	a	more	emotionally	moving	display.	The	events	of	the	1968	Democratic	National	Convention	showcased	more	than	ever	the	power	and	national	recognition	that	SDS	had	achieved	since	its	humble	beginnings	in	1962.	Even	though	the	Chicago	riot	may	not	have	been	an	officially	sanctioned	SDS	event	in	the	way	that	the	Columbia	riots	were,	it	solidified	the	student	group’s	position	and	stature	in	the	eyes	of	the	general	public.	Membership	continued	to	grow	throughout	1969,	outgrowing	college	classrooms	and	auditoriums	and	moving	their	national	meetings	to	convention	centers.		As	SDS	began	to	grow,	so	too	did	the	internal	disputes	that	would	give	rise	to	factionalism	within	its	ranks.	Unlike	the	smaller	splinter	groups	like	the	Yippies	and	MOBE	that	existed	at	the	1968	Democratic	National	Convention,	these	new,	more	opinionated	factions	did	not	cooperate	well	with	each	other.	The	largest	factions	disagreed	over	the	future	of	SDS.	Some,	like	the	Youth	Revolutionary	Movement	or	RYM,	argued	for	a	stronger	organization,	one	with	a	more	revolutionary	anti-imperialist	vision.	Others,	like	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	or	WSA,	more	commonly	known	as	the	Progressive	Labor	Party	or	PL,	would	support	a	relatively	conservative,	old-left	communist	viewpoint.26	
                                               26	This	will	be	discussed	in	the	chapter	on	the	split	of	SDS.	
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Understanding	the	rise	and	fall	of	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	is	essential	to	an	understanding	of	the	Weathermen	and	of	the	1960s	as	a	whole.	Those	who	shaped	the	student-led	organization	changed	the	public	perception	of	the	leftist	youth	movement,	and	made	student	protests	a	force	with	which	to	be	reckoned.	By	the	end	of	the	1960s,	student	protests	were	taken	seriously	by	the	American	public.	Through	the	media	and	rise	of	campus	chapters,	they	gained	the	power	to	enact	change	in	America,	or	at	least	draw	attention	to	problems	that	college-aged	American	youth	had	with	the	current	political	and	cultural	system.	However,	much	like	the	Bolsheviks	of	the	Soviet	Union	decades	before,	the	revolution	quickly	began	to	eat	its	own	children.	The	organization	had	become	so	large	and	so	widely	popular	that	it	had	inadvertently	brought	about	its	own	demise.	Factionalism	and	internal	dispute	within	SDS,	especially	the	growing	voice	of	the	Weathermen,	would	lead	to	its	doom	in	the	name	of	violent	revolution.	But	how	did	it	get	to	this	point?	In	order	to	answer	this	question,	one	must	first	be	introduced	to	the	individuals	that	would	form	the	Weathermen	Organization.		
Origins	of	the	Weathermen		 Once	each	quarter,	leading	members	of	SDS	chapters	across	the	country	would	hold	a	national	conference	during	which	they	would	discuss	their	plans	and	share	their	struggles	and	successes.	The	group	went	from	campus	to	campus,	working	with	different	chapters	and	signing	up	new	members.	As	SDS	continued	to	gain	momentum,	the	core	leadership	grew	in	power	and	in	size,	increasing	its	influence	over	a	large	number	of	members.	Unfortunately,	this	increased	
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responsibility	prevented	the	leadership	from	maintaining	a	unified	trajectory	and	by	1969,	the	group	became	extremely	factionalized.	The	immense	surge	of	new	members	brought	differing	ideas	about	how	the	organization	should	be	run	and	which	direction	it	should	take	in	the	coming	decade.	Some	factions	wanted	to	remain	more	conservatively	communist,	while	others	desired	to	place	the	group	on	a	much	more	radical	course.	Still	other	factions	wanted	to	capitalize	on	the	media	frenzy	caused	by	the	events	of	the	1967	Columbia	Protest	and	the	1968	Democratic	National	Convention	in	an	attempt	to	kickstart	a	broader	cultural	revolution,	rather	than	promote	purely	political	change.	By	the	late	1960s,	SDS	divided	itself	at	a	frenzied	pace,	and	thus	its	goals	did	so	as	well.	Many	of	the	splinter	groups	that	had	emerged	at	the	1968	Democratic	National	Convention	still	held	significant	sway	over	parts	of	the	membership,	though	some	smaller	groups	remained.	MOBE,	acting	as	more	of	a	subcommittee	of	SDS	than	as	an	independent	group,	was	a	long-standing	faction	that	was	led	by	SDS	founder	Tom	Hayden	that	strove	to	keep	the	organization’s	morale	high,	while	continuing	to	focus	on	opposing	the	Vietnam	Conflict	in	some	form	or	another—either	directly	through	SDS-sponsored	events	or	indirectly	by	working	with	thousands	of	members	to	assemble	at	protests	in	which	SDS	was	not	officially	involved.	A	smaller,	yet	equally	notable	faction	was	the	Yippies.	Having	only	a	few	hundred	members,	the	Yippies	were	defined	by	the	group’s	charismatic	leaders	Jerry	Rubin	and	Abbie	Hoffman	who	sought	to	create	more	of	a	theatrical,	media-focused	protest	group.	The	Yippies	thought	that	the	most	important	task	was	to	capture	the	media’s	attention	with	outrageous	acts	(their	actions	at	the	1968	Democratic	National	Convention	represent	a	perfect	example).	With	this	increased	
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media	attention,	the	Yippies	believed	they	could	promote	positive	change	and	even	create	an	all-new	utopian	way	of	living.	Of	all	the	factions	of	SDS,	the	Yippies	exemplified	the	spirit	of	anarchistic	cultural	idealism	that	was	one	part	of	SDS’s	appeal	to	college	youth	of	America.	They	were	not	a	group	that	had	ever,	nor	would	ever,	challenge	the	SDS	leadership	or	try	to	break	away	from	it.	Like	MOBE,	some	of	YIP’s	membership	was	not	a	part	of	SDS	directly.	The	two	factions	had	no	problem	working	within	the	mother	organization	but	maintained	their	separate	views	and	distinctive	irreverent	style.	They	had	a	foot	both	inside	and	outside	of	SDS,	with	a	small	number	of	YIP’s	membership	not	even	being	SDS	members.	Beyond	the	many	small,	non-threatening	factions	within	SDS	at	the	time,	there	were	also	larger,	more	assertive	groups	that	actively	vied	for	control.	The	Worker	Student	Alliance	(WSA),	the	student	auxiliary	of	the	Progressive	Labor	Party	(PL),	was	the	most	traditional	and	old-Left	group	in	SDS.	WSA	members	believed	in	a	more	traditional	leftist	approach	to	political	change.	This	approach	emphasized	the	importance	of	the	working-class	and	SDS	combining	in	order	to	create	a	strong	proletariat	class	that	would	rise	up	against	Western	capitalist	hegemony.	The	WSA	were	consistently	held	in	disapproval	by	other	factions,	viewed	as	being	racist	as	a	result	of	their	argument	against	Black	Nationalism.	Those	who	were	a	part	of	WSA	believed	that	Black	Nationalism	was	not	important	at	this	time,	since	in	order	for	equality	to	be	possible,	a	complete	overhaul	of	America’s	capitalist	system	would	first	have	to	be	replaced	with	communism.	The	Worker	Student	Alliance	were	ultimately	too	focused	on	creating	political	revolution,	on	the	idealistic	notion	that	they	would	realize	Marx’s	vision	and	topple	capitalism	through	a	revolution	of	the	
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proletariat.	Their	dismissal	of	racial	and	gender	equality	ensured	that	they	could	not	fully	capture	the	approval	of	many	SDS	members.		The	other	and	perhaps	most	militant	faction	was	the	Revolutionary	Youth	Movement	(RYM),	which	opposed	both	the	WSA	faction	and	the	middle	of	the	road	elements	of	SDS.	RYM	contained	the	most	radical	members	of	SDS,	opponents	of	both	the	old-Left	and	the	more	moderate	members	of	the	New	Left,	many	of	whom	were	directly	involved	in	the	mother	organization’s	leadership.	This	group	would	eventually	become	the	Weathermen.	Nevertheless,	from	its	inception	in	1969,	RYM	never	intended	to	split	from	SDS.	Instead,	its	goal	was	to	change	it	from	the	inside	out,	arguing	that	faster	radicalization	of	SDS	members	was	the	only	viable	path	for	the	mother	organization.	Influenced	heavily	by	Che	Guevara,	Mao	Zedong,	Karl	Marx,	and	Vladimir	Lenin,	the	Revolutionary	Youth	Movement	conceptualized	a	strategy	to	push	out	or	seriously	weaken	the	Progressive	Labor	Party.	The	idea	was	that	working-class	Americans	and	marginalized	groups	would	stand	beside	RYM,	and	the	path	to	a	Marxist	revolution	would	begin.	They	did	not	necessarily	want	to	destroy	SDS,	but	rather	transform	it	into	a	more	radical	organization,	one	that	could	defend	itself	from	the	US	government—and	possibly	even	defeat	it.		Led	by	Bernardine	Dohrn,	RYM	believed	firmly	that	taking	on	world	imperialism	directly	was	not	a	realistic	goal	for	SDS,	especially	considering	the	amount	of	fractionalization	occurring	within	the	group	by	the	late	1960s.	Elected	to	the	position	of	Inter-Organizational	Secretary	of	SDS	in	mid-1968,	Dohrn’s	position	within	the	mother	organization	gave	the	agenda	of	RYM	some	power	within	the	top	ranks.	Born	to	a	middle-class	family	in	Wisconsin,	Dohrn	graduated	from	the	University	of	Chicago	with	a	Bachelor’s	Degree	in	Political	Science	in	1963.	She	
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attended	law	school	at	the	same	institution	and	graduated	with	her	J.D.	in	1967.	After	working	alongside	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.,	she	became	a	member	of	SDS.	A	strong	member	of	the	organization	and	one	of	the	few	women	in	a	leadership	position,	Dohrn	traveled	to	many	countries,	working	with	radical	communist	groups	in	Eastern	Europe,	North	Vietnam,	and	Latin	America.	She	was	influenced	heavily	by	both	her	legal	education	and	these	revolutionary	groups.	Believing	the	legal	system	was	horribly	flawed	and	capitalism	and	imperialism	were	together	the	exploiters	of	the	masses,	Dohrn	wanted	to	do	more	than	merely	participate	in	SDS:	she	wanted	to	influence	it.	She	envisioned	SDS	as	a	shining	light	of	what	America	could	be:	a	society	that	is	equal	and	representative	of	all	its	people.	Working	closely	with	Dohrn	was	John	Jacobs,	known	as	J.J.,	a	close	friend	and	leader	of	SDS,	who	helped	organize	the	1968	Columbia	protests	and	was	original	members	of	SLID.		J.J.	was	born	to	vastly	different	circumstances	than	Dohrn.		The	Jacobs	were	a	prominent,	upper-middle-class,	leftist	Jewish	family	from	New	York.	Prior	to	his	years	at	Columbia,	John	immersed	himself	in	Marxist	philosophy	and	studied	the	1917	Bolshevik	Revolution.	He	was	also	influenced	by	the	work	of	Che	Guevara.	Like	Dohrn,	he	came	to	believe	that	a	more	radical	approach	was	needed	if	SDS	were	to	survive	into	the	1970s.	Together,	the	two	would	turn	the	Revolutionary	Youth	Movement	into	a	much	more	radically-focused	group:	the	Weathermen.	Mark	Rudd	also	worked	alongside	J.J.	and	Dohrn	to	drive	the	RYM	towards	a	revolutionary	stance.	A	student	at	Columbia	in	1968,	he	was	an	influential	person	in	the	1968	protests.	Rudd	was	born	to	a	middle-class,	Jewish	family	in	New	Jersey.	He	discovered	the	works	of	Karl	Marx	and	Che	Guevara	during	his	first	year	at	Columbia	and	became	a	part	of	SDS	in	1967.	Agreeing	with	Dohrn	and	Jones	on	the	
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necessity	of	infusing	SDS	with	a	sense	of	revolutionary	struggle,	Rudd	became	a	prominent	part	of	the	SDS’s	leadership	as	National	Secretary	in	1969,	just	before	the	Weathermen	emerged.	Probably	the	most	best-known	member	of	the	Weathermen,	Bill	Ayers	was	first	a	member	of	the	Revolutionary	Youth	Movement.	Ayers	grew	up	the	most	financially	well-situated	of	all	of	the	Weathermen.	He	was	the	son	of	Thomas	G.	Ayers,	who	was	at	the	time	the	Chief	Executive	Officer	of	Commonwealth	Edison.	He	attended	Lake	Forest	Academy	and	then	the	University	of	Michigan,	graduating	with	a	BA	in	American	Studies.	Often	criticized	for	his	upper-class	upbringing,	Ayers	became	interested	in	leftist	ideology	in	1965	at	the	beginning	of	the	Vietnam	Conflict,	an	interest	that	was	spurred	by	a	failed	Marine	recruitment	event	on	the	Ann	Arbor	campus	that	involved	many	anti-Vietnam	students	showing	up	to	protest.27	After	this	experience,	he	became	involved	in	SDS	and	later	on	its	leadership.	Rounding	out	the	influential	members	of	the	RYM	leadership	was	Terry	Robbins.	Close	to	Bill	Ayers,	he	came	from	a	working-class	family—one	of,	if	not	the	only,	member	of	the	Weathermen	with	a	somewhat	humble	upbringing.	His	mother	died	young	of	cancer	and	his	father	worked	in	a	garment	factory.	A	true	believer	in	radical	causes	and	communist	revolution,	Robbins	joined	SDS	in	1966	and	shortly	dropped	out	of	Kenyon	College	to	travel	to	more	radical	campuses	and	recruit	students	for	their	chapters.	A	more	sporadic	and	easily	angered	member,	his	energy	and	hard-left	line	was	exactly	what	RYM	wanted	and	needed	in	its	ranks.	He	spent	a	
                                               27	Bill	Ayers,	Fugitive	Days:	Memoirs	of	an	Antiwar	Activist	(Beacon	Press,	2001),	55.	
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lot	of	time	in	Ann	Arbor,	working	with	Ayers	and	his	girlfriend,	Diana	Oughton,	who	was	also	an	SDS	member.		RYM	and	PL	each	had	thousands	of	followers	within	SDS;	however,	in	mid-1969,	eleven	leading	members	of	RYM	would	produce	something	that	the	PL	faction	did	not:	a	manifesto.		 	
 25	
CHAPTER	TWO	
THE	WAY	THE	WIND	BLEW:	
A	SHIFT	TO	RADICAL	VIOLENCE	
Manifesto	In	May	of	1969,	the	leaders	of	the	Revolutionary	Youth	Movement	penned	a	manifesto,	“You	Don’t	Need	a	Weatherman	to	Know	Which	Way	the	Wind	Blows.”28	Eleven	influential	SDS	members,	many	of	whom	are	now	considered	pillars	of	the	radical	counterculture	submitted	the	document:		
• Bernardine	Dohrn	
• John	Jacobs	
• Mark	Rudd	
• Bill	Ayers	
• Jeff	Jones	
• Terry	Robbins	
• Karin	Ashley	
• Jim	Mellen	
• Gerry	Long	
• Howie	Machtinger	
• Steve	Tappis.	Titled	after	lyrics	from	the	song	“Subterranean	Homesick	Blues”	by	Bob	Dylan,	the	manifesto	of	nearly	forty	pages	started	as	the	platform	of	RYM	but	in	fact	
                                               28	Although	written	in	May,	the	Manifesto	was	not	published	until	June,	when	it	appeared	in	a	special	edition	of	the	New	Left	Notes	for	the	SDS	National	Convention	(18	June	1969).	
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became	the	founding	document	for	a	new	organization:	the	Weathermen.	On	the	pages	of	the	first	printing	of	the	document,	one	could	see	illustrations	of	silhouetted	soldiers	that	grew	bigger	with	each	page.	The	Weatherman	were	the	embodiment	of	the	new	revolutionary	radicalism	of	the	New	Left	in	1960s	America.	The	document	stated	the	dedicated	intent	of	eleven	individuals	to	challenge	the	US	Government	and	bring	about	its	demise.	The	writers’	ultimate	goal	was,	the	“destruction	of	US	imperialism	and	the	achievement	of	a	classless	world,”	that	is	“world	communism,”	made	official.29	Although	many	of	its	authors	led	the	RYM	and	believed	strongly	that	a	complete	split	from	SDS	was	not	absolutely	required,	it	became	evident	after	the	Weatherman	manifesto	that	the	group	had	gone	beyond	the	aspirations	and	the	methods	of	the	mother	organization,	methods	that	involved	violence.	It	was	in	effect	a	declaration	of	the	establishment	of	a	new	group.	The	statement	instantly	shocked	most	of	the	members	of	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	and	even	many	in	the	Revolutionary	Youth	Movement.	A	fair	number	of	members	of	the	RYM	faction	eventually	came	to	the	conclusion	during	the	final	days	of	the	June	National	Convention	that	the	manifesto’s	message	was	so	out	of	line	with	their	views	that	they	decided	to	cut	their	connections	to	the	old	RYM	group.	They	created	yet	another	splinter	group	within	SDS,	this	one	called	the	Revolutionary	Youth	Movement	II	(RYM	II),	to	differentiate	themselves	from	the	former	group.	The	splitting	of	the	RYM	only	further	demonstrates	the	extent	to	which	fractionalization	disrupted	the	development	of	SDS.		
                                               29	Weatherman/Weather	Underground	Organization	(submitted	by	Karin	Ashley	et	al.,	“You	Don’t	Need	a	Weatherman	to	Know	Which	Way	the	Wind	Blows,”	first	published	in	New	Left	Notes,	June	18,	1969,	Links	to	Resources	from	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS)	and	Related	Groups	and	Activities,	accessed	May,	2017,	http://www.sds-1960s.org/sds_wuo/weather/weatherman_document.txt.	
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From	the	first	appearance	of	the	Manifesto,	it	was	assumed	by	many	that	Bernardine	Dohrn	was	likely	the	main	contributor.	The	patchwork	of	Karl	Marx,	Vladimir	Lenin,	Mao	Zedong,	and	a	heavy	dose	of	Che	Guevara	flowed	from	a	melting	pot	of	radical	thought	in	a	style	reminiscent	of	Dohrn.	Mark	Rudd	and	John	Jacobs	(J.J.)	also	significantly	influenced	the	piece,	although	it	is	not	proven	that	they	specifically	wrote	any	of	it.	This	is	not	surprising	considering	their	position	and	importance	within	both	SDS	and	the	RYM	faction.	The	only	member	of	the	Weathermen	who	has	officially	spoken	out	about	who	wrote	the	piece	is	Bill	Ayers.	In	an	interview,	Ayers	explained	that	he	remembers	J.J.	being	responsible	for	writing	most	of	the	piece.30	Ultimately,	however,	the	manifesto	was	the	work	of	eleven	creative	revolutionaries	that	believed	that	they	could	advance	change	by	any	means	necessary,	all	of	them	contributing	their	own	ideas,	no	matter	whether	those	ideas	made	it	into	the	writing	of	the	document	or	not.		More	specifically,	the	manifesto’s	revolutionary	language	was	borrowed	from	the	works	of	Karl	Marx,	Vladimir	Lenin,	Mao	Zedong,	and	Che	Guevara.	Although	the	Weathermen	adopted	the	language	of	revolution,	their	goals	were	not	exactly	aligned	with	those	of	The	Communist	Manifesto.	In	The	Communist	Manifesto,	by	Karl	Marx	and	Friedrich	Engels,	a	proletarian	revolution	is	only	possible	through	the	growth	of	political	consciousness	in	the	working-class,	and	in	order	for	this	to	happen,	capitalism	must	run	its	course	first.	Not	only	do	the	young	radicals	make	note	of	the	need	to	forsake	bourgeois	ways	of	living,	the	Weathermen	push	for	revolution	immediately,	rather	than	letting	it	happen	naturally	on	its	own.	The	piece	
                                               30	Clara	Bingham,	Witness	to	the	Revolution:	Radicals,	Resisters,	Vets,	Hippies,	and	the	Year	
America	Lost	Its	Mind	and	Found	Its	Soul	(New	York,	NY:	Random	House,	2017),	508.	
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also	contained	heavy	traces	of	Latin	American	influences	drawn	from	Che	Guevara,	an	aspect	that	is	especially	visible	in	passages	like:	“the	goal	of	the	revolutionary	struggle	must	be	the	control	and	use	of	this	wealth	in	the	interests	of	the	oppressed	peoples	of	the	world.”31	By	using	language	of	this	nature,	the	Weathermen	breathed	new	life	into	old-left	Marxist	beliefs	while	at	the	same	time	using	recent	Latin	American	communist	variants	to	excite	readers	and	instill	hope	that	capitalist	America	could	truly	be	overthrown.	However,	the	combination	of	all	of	these	revolutionaries’	viewpoints	highlighted	the	lack	of	depth	in	the	radical-left’s	idea	of	American	communism.	The	Manifesto	made	it	clear	that	the	Weathermen	wanted	to	jump	into	a	revolution	that	they	did	not	have	a	clear	or	concise	plan	of	action	for.	On	the	other	hand,	the	language	of	the	Manifesto	illustrates	the	fact	that	the	Weathermen’s	goals	were	political	in	nature.	The	group	aimed	to	go	against	the	government	that	they	dwelled	within	and	act	against	it	with	violence.	This	threat	of	violence	is	one	of	the	main	components	of	the	definition	of	terrorism.	Through	this	threat	of	violence,	those	who	are	noncombatant	citizens	could	be	fearful	of	the	group.	When	one	considers	both	of	these	elements	(the	threat	of	violence	to	induce	fear	and	the	fact	that	there	was	a	political	agenda),	one	could	argue	that	the	Manifesto	could	be	that	of	a	terrorist	organization.		The	notion	that	members	of	SDS	needed	to	join	with	the	rest	of	the	world	in	arms	against	the	imperialist	governments	of	the	world	and	topple	the	capitalist	hegemony	was	not	new	to	SDS.	By	the	late	1960s,	they	had	been	struggling	to	accomplish	this	aim	for	quite	some	time.	In	spite	of	the	past	experience,	the	
                                               31	Weatherman/Weather	Underground	Organization,	“You	Don’t	Need	a	Weatherman.”	
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Weathermen	believed	that	they	could	draw	in	working-class	Americans	through	rallies	and	demonstrations,	events	that	were	to	be	more	provocative	and	violent	than	earlier	SDS	activities	in	order	to	awaken	workers	to	the	possibility	of	revolution.	Bill	Ayers	explains,	“our	logic	went	something	like	this:	working-class	youth	can	never	be	won	to	a	movement	that	is	soft	and	overly	cerebral;	even	though	we	are	soft	and	cerebral,	we’re	working	on	it	and	trying	to	prove	our	courage	and	seriousness;	when	they	see	us	raising	the	question	of	power	and	contending	for	control,	they	will	join	us	in	droves.”32	The	Weathermen	believed	that	their	main	goal	of	destroying	US	imperialism	and	replacing	it	with	communism	could	be	achieved	only	through	the	successful	gathering	of	the	working-class.	However,	yet	again	they	did	not	explain	a	specific	plan	on	how	to	convince	the	peoples	of	the	working-class	to	join	them.	The	Weathermen	simply	believed	that	when	working-class	Americans	saw	that	they	were	serious	about	revolution,	they	would	side	with	them.	But	there	was	a	naïve	disconnect	between	the	Weathermen,	who	were	made	up	of	educated	middle-class	Americans	and	the	working-class.	Thus,	without	getting	the	working-class	and	other	social	groups	to	join,	the	revolution	could	never	be	carried	out.	The	Weathermen	continued	to	ask	for	this	backing	many	times	over	the	course	of	the	next	decade,	but	with	no	response.	One	of	the	principal	targets	of	the	Weathermen	was	the	police.	According	to	the	document,	the	“pigs”	embodied	the	“capitalist	state.”33	Without	the	police,	there	would	be	no	group	to	enforce	a	conservative,	capitalist	agenda.	They	were	the	
                                               32	Ayers,	Fugitive	Days,	159.	33	Weatherman/Weather	Underground	Organization,	“You	Don’t	Need	a	Weatherman.”	
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facilitators	of	institutionalized	racism	and	systemic	oppression.	The	Manifesto	said	that	the	first	step	to	combating	capitalism	began	at	the	local	level	by	raising	“anti-pig	consciousness”	as	well	as	a	clear	“understanding	of	imperialism,	class	struggle	and	the	State.”34	Taking	a	lesson	from	history,	the	Manifesto	spoke	of	the	necessity	of	instilling	a	revolutionary	consciousness	within	the	proletariat	and	argued	that	education	would	be	the	most	powerful	tool	in	the	revolution.	Without	it,	violence	would	be	pointless.	The	Manifesto’s	expression	of	strong	support	for	the	Black	Liberation	Movement	would	make	one	think	that	the	Weathermen	saw	them	as	brothers	in	arms.	However,	this	was	not	the	case.	The	manifesto	discussed	the	need	for	African-American	rights	and	a	strong	liberation	movement	for	roughly	five	pages,	arguing	that	African-Americans	are	like	a	third-world	group	in	America,	constantly	oppressed	by	the	white	population.	The	manifesto	claimed	to	stand	with	the	Black	Liberation	Movement	and	support	it	in	every	way,	shape	and	form,	though	it	also	explained	why	the	all-white	group	behind	the	Manifesto	planned	to	fight	separately,	but	alongside,	the	Black	Liberation	Movement	to	overthrow	imperialism	and	racism	in	America.	They	argued	that	“because	all	blacks	experience	oppression	in	a	form	that	no	whites	do,	no	whites	are	in	the	position	to	fully	understand	and	test	from	their	own	practice	the	real	situation	black	people	face	and	the	necessary	response	to	it.”35	The	Weathermen,	recognizing	their	own	white,	middle-	to	upper-class	privilege,	believed	that	they	could	never	be	able	to	truly	put	themselves	in	the	shoes	of	African	Americans.	The	Black	Panthers	and	the	Black	Liberation	Movement	as	a	
                                               34	Weatherman/Weather	Underground	Organization,	“You	Don’t	Need	a	Weatherman.”	35	Weatherman/Weather	Underground	Organization,	“You	Don’t	Need	a	Weatherman.”	
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whole	later	refused	any	help	from	the	Weathermen,	claiming	that	they	were	too	naive	to	understand	African-American	struggles.	Although	the	Weathermen	were	being	led	by	Bernardine	Dohrn,	one	of	the	most	recognizable	women	in	the	left-wing	student	movement,	the	group	was	not	a	part	of	the	Women’s	Liberation	Movement.	Similar	to	their	affiliation	with	the	African-American	equality	groups,	the	Weathermen	fully	supported	the	cause	of	the	Women’s	Liberation	Movement	but	believed	in	a	long-time	Marxist	notion	that	before	equality	of	any	kind	could	be	achieved,	whether	it	was	racial	or	gender,	an	anti-imperialist,	communist	revolution	would	first	have	to	take	place.	Without	the	defeat	of	capitalism,	America	could	never	ensure	full	equality	to	its	citizens.	The	Weathermen	also	believed	that	“to	become	relevant	to	the	growing	women’s	movement,	SDS	women	should	begin	to	see	as	a	primary	responsibility	the	self-conscious	organization	of	women.”36	By	wanting	to	stir	political	consciousness	within	the	working-class	peoples	of	America	to	make	them	rise	up	and	overthrow	the	government,	the	Weathermen,	at	this	point	in	their	existence,	could	be	argued	as	terrorist	in	nature.	Their	target	was	innocent	civilians	(police,	the	upper-class);	their	goal	was	political.	However,	their	objective	was	not	to	induce	fear.	The	Weathermen	used	(a)	tactics	that	were	(b)	constructed	through	their	own	radical	socialization.	They	also	planned	to	use	(c)	violence	or	the	threat	of	violence	on	(e)	non-combatant	citizens,	in	order	to	(f)	advance	the	political	views.	However,	this	conceptualization	is	missing	one	of	the	requirements	for	terrorism	previously	outlined:	(d)	the	goal	to	induce	fear.	Even	
                                               36	Weatherman/Weather	Underground	Organization,	“You	Don’t	Need	a	Weatherman.”	
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though	at	this	point	the	Weathermen	saw	the	use	of	violence	on	non-combatants	as	an	acceptable	horror	of	revolution,	their	goal	was	not	to	induce	fear	on	those	non-combatants,	but	rather,	overthrow	the	US	government.	The	Manifesto	lays	out	the	tactics	that	the	Weathermen	plan	to	use	in	order	to	create	a	communist	revolution.	Yet,	these	tactics	and	goals	would	shift	as	their	organization	matured.		
The	Split	of	SDS	The	June	1969	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	National	Convention,	held	in	Chicago,	IL,	marked	the	beginning	of	the	Weathermen’s	reign	over	SDS	and	the	solidifying	of	a	harsher,	more	violent	strategy	for	the	group	as	a	whole.	The	new	“infusion	of	revolutionary	‘ideology’	into	SDS	caused	a	dramatic	shift	in	the	organization’s	discourse	and	culture.”37	During	the	convention,	divisions	within	the	organization	became	obvious.	The	Weathermen’s	Manifesto,	“You	Don’t	Need	a	Weatherman	to	Know	Which	Way	the	Wind	Blows,”	had	been	circulated	among	the	members	of	SDS	at	every	level.	The	Manifesto	had	been	published	in	the	June	1969	Convention	issue	of	the	New	Left	Notes.	At	this	time,	the	Weathermen	still	called	themselves	the	Revolutionary	Youth	Movement	(RYM)	and	it	was	under	this	name	that	they	had	published	their	Manifesto.	It	was	also	under	this	name	that	they	acted	as	a	determined	minority	to	divide	SDS	into	sectarian	groups.	The	radicalization	of	RYM	members,	and	their	transformation	into	the	Weathermen,	created	tension	within	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	as	a	whole.	Many	members	of	SDS	found	
                                               37	Jeremy	Varon,	Bringing	the	War	Home:	The	Weather	Underground,	the	Red	Army	Faction,	
and	Revolutionary	Violence	in	the	Sixties	and	Seventies	(Berkeley,	CA:	University	of	California	Press,	2001),	48.	
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out	about	the	new	“action	faction”	only	a	couple	of	days	before	the	Weathermen	emerged	and	took	over	the	mother	organization.	One	reporter	described	the	mood	of	the	auditorium	in	Chicago	as	no	longer	being	“free	and	open,”	explaining	that	SDS	was	no	longer	the	“free	form	group	that	it	once	was…	bedeviled	by	the	incomprehensible,	Marxist	sectarianism	which	wrecked	the	old	left.”38	As	for	the	members	of	RYM	themselves,	they	could	not	have	been	more	ready.	They	wanted	to	change	the	world,	and	in	their	minds,	this	meant	a	precisely	planned	split	from	their	mother	organization.	Mark	Rudd	describes	the	convention	center	itself	as	a	“cavernous,	gloomy	roller	rink,”39	illustrating	the	looks	of	the	building.	The	fifteen	hundred	SDS	delegates	to	the	convention	were	meeting	at	the	Chicago	Coliseum.	The	original	plan	had	been	for	the	convention	to	be	held	on	a	college	campus,	but	further	threats	from	the	FBI	created	a	need	for	a	different	location.	The	Coliseum	was,	in	reality,	a	great	location,	giving	SDS	the	power	to	keep	the	media,	the	FBI,	the	police,	and	all	others	who	were	not	members	out	of	the	facility.	The	secrecy	of	the	meeting	created	a	frenzy	outside	its	walls,	consisting	of	police	officers,	the	media,	and	crowds	of	other	non-SDSers,	all	speculating	about	what	was	happening	inside	the	arena.			Inside	the	Coliseum,	things	were	even	more	tense	and	chaotic.	The	RYM	officially	declared	themselves	the	Weathermen.	Dohrn,	Rudd,	Ayers,	and	the	eight	other	RYM	leaders	who	had	signed	the	Manifesto	were	intent	on	taking	over	SDS	and	casting	out	those	who	disagreed.	The	two	other	main	factions,	the	Worker	
                                               38	Varon,	Bringing	the	War	Home,	49.	39	Mark	Rudd,	Underground:	My	Life	with	SDS	and	the	Weathermen	(New	York:	HarperCollins	Publishers,	2009),	148.	
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Student	Alliance	(WSA)/Progressive	Labor	Party	(PL)	and	Revolutionary	Youth	Movement	II,	opposed	the	actions	and	goals	the	Weathermen	put	forward.	As	a	result,	the	leaders	of	the	Weathermen	sought	to	remove	those	belonging	to	the	WSA/PL	while	simultaneously	reabsorbing	RYM	II.	The	Worker	Student	Alliance	(WSA)	faction,	also	known	on	a	global	level	as	being	a	part	of	the	Progressive	Labor	Party	(PL),	was	a	clear	contrast	to	RYM	(or	the	newly-named	Weathermen).	The	Maoist-leaning	WSA	focused	on	class	conflict	above	all	other	issues,	aligning	themselves	with	the	working-class	and	proletarian	groups	of	the	United	States.	Essentially,	WSA	wanted	to	create	a	popular	revolution,	led	by	the	party,	as	Lenin	had	done	in	Russia	in	1917.	They	believed	in	class	struggle	and	class	struggle	only,	claiming	this,	rather	than	racism,	was	the	problem	in	America.	The	WSA	was	a	group	that	wanted	to	remain	far	away	from	the	counterculture	of	the	1960s	in	order	to	appeal	to	its	constituents.	Paradoxically,	the	WSA	had	grown	inside	the	big	umbrella	of	SDS,	an	organization	made	specifically	for	the	counterculture.	The	WSA	leaders	approached	the	notion	of	class	struggle	under	the	assumption	that	there	was	“no	such	thing	as	black	culture	and	white	culture	[but]	only	working-class	culture	and	bourgeois	culture.”40	Rudd	later	described	the	WSA	from	the	point	of	view	of	a	Weatherman,	saying,	“PLers	didn’t	smoke	dope	or	wear	their	hair	long.	That	would	turn	off	the	workers,	who	according	to	the	PL	line,	were	serious	proletarians	and	wanted	nothing	to	do	with	the	counterculture.”41	RYM	rejected	these	views	and	would	no	longer	tolerate	their	membership	in	SDS.	Because	by	1969	most	of	the	SDS	secretaries,	office	holders,	and	leaders	were	a	part	
                                               40	Varon,	Bringing	the	War	Home,	46.	41	Rudd,	Underground,	142.	
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of	the	RYM	faction	that	later	became	the	Weathermen,	it	was	not	difficult	to	push	the	PLers	out	of	SDS.	RYM	II	was	created	at	the	June	SDS	National	Convention	by	dissident	members	of	RYM	who	did	not	agree	with	the	increasingly	militant	leaders	of	RYM.	The	group	emerged	from	the	convention	as	an	effect	of	the	conflict	between	members	of	SDS.	Led	by	previous	RYM	member	Mike	Klonsky,	the	members	of	RYM	II	sat	in	the	middle-ground	between	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	and	the	increasingly	leftward	movement	of	RYM.	Those	who	stayed	with	RYM	and	did	not	join	the	Weathermen	“felt	that	the	politics	presented	in	the	‘Weathermen’	statement	neglected	to	account	for	class,	especially	the	revolutionary	potential	of	white	workers.”42	Even	though	their	views	appeared	to	be	much	like	that	of	the	WSA,	with	traditional	Marxist	ideology.	Much	like	PL,	they	held	old-leftist	values,	and	“sought	to	capture	white	allegiance	by	appealing	to	white	‘material	interest’	-	wages,	or	hours,	or	benefits.”43	RYM	II	did	not	go	as	far	as	to	make	the	argument	that	there	was	no	such	thing	as	racial	struggle.	They	agreed	with	RYM	that	the	struggle	included	imperialism,	but	they	also	wanted	to	follow	the	traditional	Marxist	values	that	WSA	spoke	for,	but	not	as	conservatively.	Specifically,	they	thought	the	WSA	was	blindly	excluding	the	idea	of	racial	struggle.	Where	PL	tended	to	reject	black	nationalism,	RYM	II	took	the	opposite	approach.	They	wanted	to	draw	a	fine	middle	line	between	the	WSA	and	the	RYM.	By	doing	so	at	the	June	1969	Convention,	this	faction	of	RYM	wanted	to	begin	to	move	“much	more	immediately	toward	the	
                                               42	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	87.	43	Barber,	A	Hard	Rain	Fell,	175.	
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creation	of	a	Communist	party.”44	This	involved	teaming	up	with	RYM	at	the	Convention	and	helping	them	push	out	PL,	the	move	that	allowed	the	Weathermen	to	be	officially	formed.	On	the	first	day	of	the	Convention,	18	June,	1969,	delegates	from	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	chapters	across	the	country	gathered	at	the	Chicago	Coliseum	to	begin	a	five-day	celebration.	As	the	festivities	began,	it	was	clear	that	both	wings	of	RYM	were	setting	out	to	remove	the	Worker	Student	Alliance	from	SDS.	Opening	remarks	led	to	sparring	between	WSA	and	RYM,	and	a	series	of	arguments,	“clashing	over	seemingly	minor	procedural	issues.”45	One	example	was	a	proposal	by	PL	that	all	“mainstream	media	be	barred	completely	from	the	convention.”46	By	this	time,	the	Weathermen	Manifesto	had	been	circulated	to	the	members	of	SDS	in	the	convention’s	issue	of	the	New	Left	Notes.	Mark	Rudd	later	made	the	argument	that	the	manifesto	was	“the	perfect	sort	of	dig	at	the	super-straight	PLers,”	explaining	further	that	one	did	not	need	“ancient	dogmas	to	understand	the	reality	around”47	them	at	the	time,	a	critique	of	WSA’s	very	hardcore,	traditional	Marxist	line.	David	Gilbert	remembers	that	when	he	went	to	the	convention,	he	never	expected	a	complete	split	of	SDS;	however,	he	did	go	“prepared	for	a	battle.”48	Ultimately,	the	first	day	was	full	of	bickering	and	distrust.	When	RYM	suggested	having	a	participant	of	the	Chinese	Red	Guard	speak	on	his	experiences	in	the	cultural	revolution,	PL	opposed	the	idea	in	mere	hatred	of	RYM.		
                                               44	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	87.	45	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	83.	46	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	83.	47	Rudd,	Underground,	146.	48	David	Gilbert,	Love	and	Struggle:	My	Life	in	SDS,	the	Weather	Underground,	and	Beyond	(Oakland,	CA:	PM	Press,	2012),	113.	
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Friday,	the	second	day	of	the	convention,	started	off	with	great	ferocity.	The	leaders	of	both	RYM	factions	(the	now	Weathermen	and	RYM	II)	“engineered	a	show	of	solidarity,”	as	they	had	invited	leaders	of	the	“Young	Lords,	a	Puerto	Rican	nationalist	group,	and	the	Black	Panthers”49	to	address	the	assembly	of	constituents.	This	would	prove	to	be	a	“powerful	blow	to	PL	and	its	‘all	nationalism	is	reactionary	line,’”50	as	both	factions	would	later	criticize	WSA	as	having	racist	and	sexist	tendencies.	First	to	speak	was	Black	Panther	revolutionary	Rufus	“Chaka”	Walls.	Calling	out	PL	as	“armchair	Marxists,”	he	“sneered	at	[their]	claims	of	being	a	vanguard	party	and	declared	that	the	Panthers	were	the	true	vanguard	because	they	had	been	out	shedding	blood	and	the	white	left	hadn’t	even	shot	rubber	bands	yet.”51	In	actuality,	Walls	was	addressing	white	left	radicals	as	a	whole.	He	further	spoke	on	the	role	of	women	within	SDS,	“criticizing	women’s	liberation	as	‘pussy	power.’”52	This	became	an	insult	to	all	factions	present	at	the	convention,	horrifying	RYM	and	causing	PL	to	begin	chanting	“Stop	Male	Chauvinism!”	Although	members	of	the	Progressive	Labor	Party	seemed	to	rally	against	male	chauvinism,	it	was	only	insofar	as	their	support	would	counter	the	Black	Panthers’	insults	and	sneers.	In	reality,	“PL	saw	the	struggle	for	women’s	rights	in	much	the	same	terms	as	it	viewed	the	struggle	for	black	rights…	Women	in	American	society	faced	no	special	oppression,	they	were	simply	‘superexploited’	as	workers.”53	When	the	chanting	would	not	cease,	the	session	concluded	with	a	fist	fight.		
                                               49	Barber,	A	Hard	Rain	Fell,	164.	50	Barber,	A	Hard	Rain	Fell,	164.	51	Sale,	SDS,	566.	52	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	84.	53	Barber,	A	Hard	Rain	Fell,	166.	
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Tensions	were	at	an	all-time	high	following	the	scuffle,	and	yet	amidst	the	shouting	and	fighting,	RYM	II	officially	stepped	into	the	conversation	as	a	new,	completely	independent	group,	no	longer	affiliated	with	RYM.	Going	into	the	convention,	those	who	would	create	RYM	II	were	still	considered	a	part	of	RYM	merely	disagreeing	on	certain	issues,	but	still	remaining	inside	the	newly	named	Weathermen	faction.	RYM	preferred	to	push	women’s	liberation	and	the	women’s	movement	in	general	to	the	side;	however,	they	did	“recognize	the	real	reactionary	danger	of	women’s	groups	that	are	not	self-consciously	revolutionary	and	anti-imperialist…	and	while	[they]	did	speak	of	the	[real]	necessity	to	‘smash	male	supremacy,’	[they]	again	offered	no	picture	of	how	male	supremacy	manifested	itself	in	men.”54	RYM	believed	that,	for	now,	the	fight	was	against	the	imperialist	forces	of	America	and	that	only	after	revolution	was	achieved	would	women’s	liberation	be	possible.	The	20th	of	June	began	like	the	first	two	days	did:	riddled	with	tense	conversations	and	bickering	between	factions.	RYM	had	come	to	the	conclusion	that	kicking	out	PL	was	the	most	important	step	in	being	able	to	move	SDS	towards	the	revolutionary	path	RYM	wished.	PL	leader	Jeff	Gordon	spoke	in	front	of	the	assembly	saying	“PL…	will	not…	be	intimidated	out	of	SDS.”55	The	main	leaders	of	RYM	—	Bernardine	Dohrn,	Terry	Robbins,	Mark	Rudd,	and	RYM	II	leader	Mike	Klonsky	—	stood	backstage,	thinking	about	how	to	react	to	Gordon.	They	were	“reluctant	to	split	the	organization,	no	matter	how	much	[they]	despised	PL.”56	
                                               54	Barber,	A	Hard	Rain	Fell,	166.	55	Rudd,	Underground,	150.	56	Rudd,	Underground,	151.	
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Focusing	on	anti-imperialism	and	anti-racism,	Bernardine	Dohrn	spoke	for	RYM	and	“led	the	RYM	bloc	in	a	walkout	from	the	plenary	session,	saying	that	the	organization	needed	to	decide	if	it	could	allow	in	its	ranks	those	who	denied	the	right	of	self-determination	for	oppressed	people.”57	The	number	of	walk-out	members	grew	to	around	five	hundred.58	This	was	seen	by	RYM	as	a	victory,	illustrating	how	PL	did	not	have	the	number	of	constituents	that	it	would	take	to	overpower	the	RYM	factions	and	stay	within	SDS,	let	alone	overthrow	the	current	leadership	and	seize	control.		 The	fourth	day	of	the	convention	began	with	the	main	factions	of	SDS	meeting	on	opposite	sides	of	the	convention	hall.	The	discussion	resumed	and	as	it	continued	it	became	evident	that	PL’s	expulsion	was	probable.	Although	PL	had	a	“sure,	tight,	almost	missionary	state	of	mind	that	made	them	certain	they	held	the	‘correct	revolutionary	line,’”59	they	could	not	successfully	achieve	a	hostile	takeover	of	SDS.	They	simply	did	not	have	the	delegates	and	constituent	support.	After	the	opening	talks	had	ceased,	chanting	began,	Bernardine	Dohrn	grabbed	the	microphone	and	gave	a	speech,	hostile	to	WSA	and	calling	for	the	removal	of	it	from	the	SDS	completely.	Mark	Rudd	recalls	that	“for	about	twenty	minutes,	[Dohrn]	recounted	all	of	PL’s	crimes,”	and	accused	PL	of	being	“objectively	racist,	anti-communist,	and	reactionary.”60	Dohrn	claimed	that	SDS	was	“becoming	a	revolutionary	movement;	and	as	such,	it	could	not	allow	a	group	such	as	PL	in	its	ranks.”61	She	called	for	the	complete	expulsion	of	WSA.	After	this	speech,	Dohrn	led	
                                               57	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	84.	58	Rudd,	Underground,	151.	59	Rudd,	Underground,	142.	60	Rudd,	Underground,	152.	61	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	86.	
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RYM	into	the	main	convention	hall	where	WSA	delegates	were	gathered	and	gave	the	faction	the	official	news:	it	was	over.	In	the	eyes	of	the	entire	RYM	faction,	WSA	had	“attacked	every	revolutionary	nationalist	struggle,”62	and	that	could	not	be	forgiven.	The	final	day	of	the	June	Convention	was	concise	and	docile.	The	Weathermen	were	now	in	full	control	of	all	leadership	positions	within	SDS;	WSA	had	been	officially	cast	out,	and	the	dissidents	of	RYM	II	were	not	a	threat.	Aside	from	the	two	remaining	main	factions,	the	Weathermen	and	their	opponents	within	RYM,	now	called	RYM	II,	“other	[smaller]	pre-formed	groups—Yippie	collectives,	the	Panthers,	and	the	Radical	Union,	for	example—stayed	with	the	SDS	regulars.”63	Although	not	formally	part	of	SDS	any	longer,	WSA	continued	to	meet	at	the	Coliseum,	claiming	themselves	the	true	SDS.	It	elected	its	own	national	officers	and	voted	to	set	up	its	own	SDS	National	Office	in	Cambridge,	Massachusetts.	Back	in	the	main	convention	hall,	Dohrn,	Rudd,	Jacobs,	and	other	leaders	of	SDS	began	planning	future	events	in	Chicago,	including	protests	during	the	trial	of	the	“Chicago	Eight.”	The	June	1969	SDS	National	Convention	was	as	much	a	celebration	as	it	was	a	struggle.	The	emergence	of	the	Weathermen	into	a	larger	spotlight	created	a	displacement	of	the	New	Left	from	its	previous	path	and	changed	the	movement’s	course	of	action	forever.	The	Weathermen	took	an	organization	that	was	beginning	to	crack	and	split	it	wide	open,	fracturing	SDS	into	pieces	that	could	not	be	put	together	again.	Rudd	says	that	the	split	“marked	the	beginning	of	the	end	for	SDS.”64	
                                               62	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	86.	63	Sale,	SDS,	575.	64	Rudd,	Underground,	153.	
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Although	RYM	II	disagreed	with	its	mother	faction	RYM,	RYM	II	never	posed	any	threat	to	the	Weathermen	faction,	the	new	leadership	of	SDS.	Shortly	after	the	convention,	RYM	II	began	to	splinter	into	a	host	of	tiny	vanguard	parties.	These	parties	tended	to	focus	on	one	specific	issue,	like	gender	equality	or	Native	American	rights	for	example,	rather	than	a	host	of	many	different	issues	that	a	larger	group	may	not	view	as	highly	important.	The	Weathermen	felt	that	they	need	not	concern	themselves	with	Mike	Klonsky	and	the	quickly	disintegrating	RYM	II	group,	rather	they	looked	forward	to	testing	out	whether	or	not	the	Weathermen	could	successfully	inspire	a	revolution.	Their	assumption	proved	correct,	but	their	own	confidence	over	the	viability	of	the	Weathermen	would	prove	to	play	a	significant	part	in	their	own	demise.		On	the	first	day	of	the	convention,	Abbie	Hoffman	is	reported	to	have	said,	“we	have	come	to	praise	SDS,	not	to	bury	it,”65	but	this	is	not	how	the	national	convention	ended	up	playing	out.	The	June	1969	National	Convention	was	the	last	convention	SDS	had.	The	mass	membership	that	SDS	had	finally	achieved	after	years	of	hard	work	had	become	its	own	downfall.	The	Weathermen	emerged	within	SDS	and	then	became	increasingly	radical.	They	took	over	SDS	in	1969	when	factionalism	had	pushed	the	organization	to	its	end.	The	Weathermen	members	who	were	not	a	part	of	the	Weathermen	faction	soon	splintered	off,	some	joining	other	organizations	that	resembled	SDS.	Some	of	the	smaller	factions	within	SDS	survived	the	split.	The	Yippies	and	RYM	II,	for	example,	remained	as	autonomous	and	identifiable	groups.	The	Yippies	stuck	to	their	own	messages	of	media	blitz	and	
                                               65	Sale,	SDS,	557.	
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communal-style	living,	while	RYM	II	carried	a	communist	message	that	could	incorporate	anti-racism,	but	also	appeal	to	working-class	Americans.		Around	the	mid-1970s,	all	of	these	factions	began	to	fade	out	of	the	public	eye	and	become	nonfunctional,	including	the	Weathermen.	But	first,	the	Weathermen,	in	their	new	radical	stance	began	their	path	towards	a	revolution	that	they	viewed	as	viable.	Their	intentions	were	illustrated	in	their	key	slogan:	“Bring	the	War	Home!”	This	home	would	be	Chicago,	and	the	event	would	be	a	coming	out	of	sorts,	now	called	the	Days	of	Rage.		 	
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CHAPTER	THREE	
IT’S	ALRIGHT	MA	(IM	ONLY	BLEEDING)	
FROM	WEATHERMEN	ABOVE,	TO	UNDERGORUND	ORGANIZATION	BELOW	
The	Days	of	Rage	After	the	National	Convention,	SDS	was	an	organization	in	name	only.	Instead,	the	Weathermen	controlled	what	was	once	SDS	until	the	official	end	of	the	college-based	organization	in	late	1970,	when	many	members	of	the	group’s	leadership	went	underground	as	Weathermen.	The	last	day	of	the	convention,	22	June,	was	devoted	to	planning	for	the	Days	of	Rage.	The	RYM	collective	wanted	to	get	started	on	the	new	direction	of	SDS	as	soon	as	possible	and	recruit	as	many	to	join	the	group	as	they	could,	especially	college	students	and	members	of	the	working-class.	From	8	October	to	11	October	1969,	the	Weathermen	intended	on	“Bringing	the	War	Home.”	Although	there	was	a	demonstration	mid-September	to	protest	the	trial	of	the	famous	‘Chicago	Eight,’	this	was	the	real	coming-out	event	of	the	new	Weathermen-controlled	SDS.	This	event	was	designed	to	provoke	radical	violence	and	pro-revolutionary	sentiment.	It	was,	essentially,	supposed	to	be	the	spark	that	lit	the	fire	of	revolution.	This	means	that	the	Weathermen	were	not	concerned	with	the	safety	of	non-combatants,	they	figured	that	citizens	who	were	not	in	favor	of	their	cause,	specifically	the	police,	deserved	violence	and	blood-shed.	There	were	no	innocents	in	their	minds:	one	was	either	with	the	Weathermen	or	against	them;	there	was	no	middle	ground.	The	willingness	to	attack	non-combatant	citizens	is	an	element	that	
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is	a	part	of	the	conceptualization	of	terrorism;	however,	there	is	still	no	proof	that	the	Weathermen’s	goal	was	to	induce	fear,	an	essential	component	of	terrorism.		The	Weathermen	were	intent	on	creating	the	path	toward	what	they	saw	as	a	viable	revolution.	They	sought	an	end	to	American	imperialism,	racism,	and	the	Vietnam	Conflict.	They	were	also	increasingly	in	conflict	with	the	police.	Mark	Rudd	recalls	that	over	the	course	of	that	summer,	“both	the	Black	Panther	Party’s	office	and	the	SDS	National	Office	had	been	raided	by	the	Chicago	police,	with	several	Panthers	arrested,”	adding	that	during	the	September	demonstration	for	the	Chicago	Eight,	“twelve	members	of	the	Chicago	Weathermen	collective	and	people	from	the	National	Office	had	been	beaten	and	arrested.”66	Things	had	gotten	more	confrontational	since	the	events	at	the	1968	Democratic	National	Convention	a	year	before	and	the	strong	anti-police	words	in	the	Weathermen	Manifesto.	The	Chicago	Police	would	no	longer	tolerate	any	anti-war	or	anti-imperialist	agendas.		Two	nights	before	the	beginning	of	the	event,	on	6	October,	1969,	the	Weathermen	struck	symbolically	at	the	police.	The	leadership	sent	out	a	small	team	to	detonate	their	first	bomb,	one	that	destroyed	the	ten-foot	bronze	statue	of	a	Policeman	in	Haymarket	Square,	which	was	the	site	of	the	violent	1886	labor	rally	in	which	eleven	people	died,	seven	of	which	were	police.67		 On	the	first	day,	8	October,	1969,	the	Weathermen	had	planned	a	large	rally	in	Lincoln	Park,	expecting	over	25,000	youth	and	middle-class	people.	Their	expectations	were	wildly	overestimated,	as	only	about	700	to	800	would	attend	in	
                                               66	Rudd,	Underground,	171.	67	Although	this	was	technically	the	first	official	bombing	done	by	the	Weathermen,	it	is	usually	not	recorded	that	way.	
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reality.	The	Weathermen	leadership	did	not	know	that	the	number	of	attendees	would	grow	throughout	the	following	three	days;	however,	the	first	day’s	turnout	was	an	extreme	disappointment	to	them.	It	could	already	be	argued	as	the	first	case	in	which	the	Weathermen	had	to	face	the	realization	that	bringing	about	revolution	was	a	very	difficult	task,	one	that	could	quite	possibly	be	far	beyond	their	reach.	Regardless	of	this	let	down,	the	event	began	anyway	with	a	speech	by	Bernardine	Dohrn	at	9	p.m.	In	her	speech,	she	points	out	that	it	was,	in	fact,	the	second	anniversary	of	the	death	of	Che	Guevara.68	From	the	start,	her	speech	was	designed	to	generate	a	reaction	from	the	youthful	crowd,	one	that	intended	to	incite	outrage	and	a	feeling	of	loss.	Shortly	after	Dohrn,	Tom	Hayden	appeared.	Everyone	knew	his	name,	one	of	the	founders	of	SDS	and	a	part	of	the	“Chicago	Eight”	who	were	on	trial	from	the	1968	Democratic	National	Convention	riots	a	year	before.	Mark	Rudd	remembers	that	it	was	uplifting	that	a	“non-Weatherman	supported	[their]	efforts.”69	There	were	not	many	outside	organizations	that	supported	the	Weathermen.	“Only	one	other	national	group,	Youth	Against	War	and	Fascism	(YAWF),	the	youth	branch	of	the	Workers	World	Party	(WWP),	one	of	the	many	tiny	Communist	parties,	sent	a	contingent”	for	the	Days	of	Rage.70	The	support	was	appreciated,	but	it	did	not	do	much	to	boost	attendance	numbers	on	that	night	in	Lincoln	Park.		The	Weathermen	were	not	even	the	only	group	demonstrating	in	Chicago	during	the	four	days	of	the	Weathermen	event.	A	rival	demonstration,	created	by	
                                               68	Rudd,	Underground,	173.	69	Rudd,	Underground,	173.	70	Rudd,	Underground,	173.	
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Mike	Klonsky	and	RYM	II,	and	involving	Fred	Hampton,	a	leader	of	the	Chicago	Black	Panthers,	were	present	in	Chicago	as	well.	On	the	same	night	as	the	Weathermen’s	first	day	of	rage,	Fred	Hampton	was	signed	up	at	the	RYM	II	event	to	make	a	speech.	This	made	it	very	clear	just	how	factionalized	and	broken	SDS	was	by	1969.	Back	in	Lincoln	Park,	around	10:35	p.m.,	Jeff	Jones	took	the	microphone	shouting	“the	code	words,	‘I	am	Marion	Delgado!’—evoking	the	name	of	a	five-year-old	California	boy	who	in	1947	had	placed	a	concrete	block	on	railroad	tracks	to	derail	an	oncoming	locomotive.”71	This	was	the	war-cry	to	begin	the	battle,	the	riot.	Jones’s	words	signified	that	the	Weathermen	were	calling	for	the	derailing	of	the	American	government	and	a	sort	of	“David	and	Goliath”	outlook	on	the	fight.	This	was	what	the	Days	of	Rage	were	all	about:	the	belief	that	although	they	were	but	a	small	group,	they	could	defeat	the	giant	American	imperialist	government.	This	naive	idealism	pervaded	every	action	of	the	group	and	was	a	characteristic	that	would	inevitably	stop	them	from	achieving	their	goals	in	the	end.		The	protesters	ran	down	the	streets	of	Chicago,	toward	the	city’s	affluent	Gold	Coast,	chanting	and	screaming,	trying	to	catch	the	police	off	guard.	Weathermen	smashed	windows	of	businesses	and	shops,	police	cars,	and	homes,	creating	a	theatrical	show	on	purpose.	They	wanted	to	get	the	attention	of	the	upper	classes	and	challenge	any	elitism	in	sight.	They	succeeded	in	this.	Police	barricades	began	to	cut	off	the	protesters	near	the	heart	of	the	city.	Bill	Ayers	recalls	that	“tear	gas	seized	the	air	as	wailing	sirens	crisscrossed	the	city	streets.”72	The	first	day	ended	in	a	riotous	mess,	concluding	around	11:30	p.m.	with	thirty	protesters	beaten	
                                               71	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	79.	72	Bill	Ayers,	Fugitive	Days,	180.	
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to	the	pavement,	six	Weathermen	shot	(though	none	injured	seriously),	and	dozens	of	arrests.73	One	thing	was	for	certain,	“the	macho	mood	was	dissipated,”	concludes	historian	Kirkpatrick	Sale,	“no	one	seemed	to	have	joined	the	Weatherranks	that	night.”74		 Although	most	accounts	say	that	there	were	dozens	of	arrests	on	that	first	night,	Bill	Ayers	places	the	number	near	one	hundred.	Moreover,	he	emphasizes	that	it	was	not	only	the	large	number	that	was	notable.	It	was	important	to	see	that	“each	arrest	was	in	fact	a	collision	of	pain	and	blood	and	ripped	skin	and	chipped	teeth	or	broken	bone:	broken	arms	and	legs,	fractured	skulls	and	jaws,	concussions,	lacerations,	burns,	and	abrasions.”75	However,	this	illustrative	figure	is	contradicted	by	Mark	Rudd	who	offers	a	more	moderate	account,	putting	the	number	of	arrests	at	sixty-eight.76	Kathy	Wilkerson	also	says	that	“sixty-eight	people	had	been	arrested.”77	Number	of	arrests	aside,	the	night	had	ended	in	violence	and	bloodshed.	Ayers	claimed	that	the	police	violence	only	got	worse	for	those	who	were	arrested,	with	“systematic	beatings,	breaking	people’s	glasses	in	their	faces,	mace	at	close	range,	stompings,	and	gauntlets	to	run.”78	This	blatant	disregard	by	police	of	the	legal	process	only	infuriated	the	Weathermen	more.	Seeing	their	comrades	injured	did	nothing	but	fuel	the	fire.	They	remained	intent	on	continuing	their	Days	of	Rage	celebration,	no	matter	the	cost.	After	all,	violence	was	to	be	expected	in	an	overthrow	of	the	government.		
                                               73	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	80.	74	Sale,	SDS,	601.	75	Ayers,	Fugitive	Days,	184.	76	Rudd,	Underground,	175.	77	Cathy	Wilkerson,	Flying	Close	to	the	Sun	(New	York:	Seven	Stories	Press,	2007),	302.	78	Ayers,	Fugitive	Days,	184.	
 48	
	 It	took	the	next	two	days,	9	October	and	10	October,	to	bail	leading	members	out	of	jail.	There	was	supposed	to	be	a	women’s	march	on	Thursday,	9	October,	but	it	did	not	happen,	partly	because	of	a	low	turnout	due	to	so	many	Weathermen	still	being	incarcerated.	Weatherman	David	Gilbert	remembers	that	when	“Illinois	called	out	the	National	Guard,	some	of	the	other	actions	[we	had]	planned…	had	to	be	cancelled.”79	Weathermen	members	were	desperate	to	make	sure	the	Days	of	Rage	did	not	go	down	as	a	loss	for	the	cause	of	anti-imperialism.		The	Weathermen	reassembled	on	what	would	be	the	final	Day	of	Rage,	Saturday,	11	October,	1969,	in	the	Chicago	Loop,	“marching	peacefully	through	[the]	downtown	streets,”	past	police	lines.80	Once	again	the	marchers	sought	out	the	Chicago	Police.	Coming	upon	them,	rioting	then	began	when	David	Gilbert	“threw	a	bottle”	at	them,	“which	shattered	at	their	feet”	as	he	dashed	past	them.81	Again,	the	protesters	found	themselves	face-to-face	with	the	less-than-compassionate	Chicago	Police.	The	police	were	ready	this	time	and	according	to	historian	Bryan	Burrough,	proceeded	to	mercilessly	beat	“everyone	with	long	hair	until	they	fell,	bloodied,	into	the	gutters.”82	Many	arrests	were	made;	an	outcome	that	was	not	much	different	than	the	two	previous	days.	Burrough	also	claims	that	“more	than	120	people	were	arrested,”	and	that	there	was	one	serious	injury,	“a	city	attorney	named	Richard	Elrod,	who	charged	at	[Weatherman]	Brian	Flanagan,	lost	his	balance,	and	hit	his	head,	leaving	him	paralyzed	from	the	neck	down;”83	however,	a	jury	later	found	Flannagan	not	guilty.	The	FBI	recorded	that	during	the	four	days,	“59	police	officers	
                                               79	Gilbert,	Love	and	Struggle,	133.	80	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	80.	81	Gilbert,	Love	and	Struggle,	133.	82	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	80.	83	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	80.	
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sustained	personal	injury	including	abrasions,	contusions,	cuts	and	bruises	on	the	arms,	legs,	groins,	body	and	head;	human	bites	on	the	arms	and	hands,	loose	teeth	and	injury	to	eyes	and	ears,”84	an	outcome	that	is	normally	overlooked.			 From	the	moment	of	its	conclusion,	the	Days	of	Rage	was	recognized	as	a	colossal	failure	and	disappointment.	Despite	many	weeks	of	“intense	organizing—speeches	at	campuses,	outreach	to	other	movement	groups,	daily	trips	to	high	schools,	and	‘exemplary’	acts	of	militancy—the	Weathermen	brought	almost	no	one	new	to	Chicago.”85	An	event	that	was	supposed	to	draw	many	thousands	to	Chicago	in	the	name	of	revolution,	anti-racism,	and	anti-imperialism,	can	be	seen	historically	as	another	step	towards	the	end	of	the	Weathermen,	a	moment	in	which	the	movement	was	proven	to	have	a	far	smaller	membership	than	was	originally	expected	and	far	less	revolutionary	potential.	It	can	be	argued	that	because	of	this,	many	historians	today	do	not	give	the	event	much	time	or	consideration	when	it	comes	to	its	overall	cultural	effect;	however,	this	is	certainly	a	mistake.	The	fact	that	an	event	like	this	was	even	considered,	let	alone	planned	and	created,	shows	the	real	cultural	tide	of	the	decade,	the	cultural	tide	of	the	decade	being	a	radicalization	of	popular	culture.	The	Weathermen,	who	had	been	peacefully	singing	anti-Vietnam	songs	in	the	mid-1960s,	had	now	shifted	towards	radical	violence.		Although	there	was	a	lower	turnout	than	expected,	many	men	and	women	
did	attend,	they	did	participate	in	an	expression	of	anger	and	outrage	towards	the	Vietnam	Conflict	and	the	actions	the	government	had	been	taking	in	many	areas	of	
                                               84	Federal	Bureau	of	Investigation	(Chicago	office),	“Foreign	Influence	–	Weather	Underground	Organization,”	dated	August	20,	1976,	Links	to	Resources	from	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS)	and	Related	Groups	and	Activities,	accessed	May,	2017,	http://www.sds-1960s.org/wuo.htm.	85	Varon,	Bringing	the	War	Home,	77.	
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the	world.	Burrough	argues	that	the	Days	of	Rage	“did	achieve	something	important:	it	marked	Weathermen	as	the	leading	player	on	the	‘heavy	edge’	of	the	New	Left,	the	furthest	left,	the	wildest,	the	craziest,	the	most	committed.”86	They	were	not	afraid	to	be	arrested,	beaten,	or	shot;	they	would	send	their	message	regardless	of	the	cost.	Rudd	says	that	the	Weathermen	were	now	“a	classic	cult,	true	believers	surrounded	by	a	hostile	world	that	[they]	rejected	and	that	rejected	[them]	in	return;”	he	adds	that	“the	rest	of	the	movement	hated	us,	which	only	confirmed	the	rightness	of	our	path.”87	They	now	understood	the	membership	that	they	had	to	work	with.	Ayers	remembers	it	as	an	important	moment,	that	they	were	now	ready,	“dress	rehearsal	behind	[them],	to	plunge	headlong	into	the	whirlpool	of	violence.”88			
The	FBI	and	Going	Underground		 The	aftermath	of	the	Days	of	Rage	brought	about	a	multitude	of	adjustments	for	the	Weathermen.	The	violent	events	separated	the	Weathermen	from	other	Leftist	student	groups	and	the	leaders	had	to	face	the	harsh	reality	that	they	were	a	small	group	of	about	300	members	and	could	not	grow	much	bigger.	SDS	was	hanging	on	by	a	thread,	increasingly	fragmented	and	barely	functioning	due	to	its	leadership	consisting	of	Weathermen,	who	were	concerned	with	their	own	group’s	agenda.	The	Weathermen	were	planning	events	that	did	not	involve	SDS	and	leaving	it	in	limbo,	and	increasingly	since	the	SDS	June	1969	Convention,	the	group	faced	a	new	problem:	FBI	scrutiny.		
                                               86	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	80.	87	Rudd,	Underground,	184.	88	Ayers,	Fugitive	Days,	187.	
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The	FBI	counterintelligence	program,	COINTELPRO,	was	headed	by	J.	Edgar	Hoover,	who	had	personally	become	interested	in	the	Weathermen	after	they	took	over	SDS	at	the	June	1969	convention.	The	bureau	saw	the	Weathermen	as	a	made-in-America	communist	revolutionary	group	and	considered	it	an	overwhelming	threat	to	democracy.	COINTELPRO	was	a	special	unit	that	used	illegal	programs	conducted	by	FBI	agents	under	the	table,	without	the	knowledge	of	the	general	public;	they	employed	techniques	of	infiltration,	extralegal	force,	harassment	of	activists	and	organization	leaders,	psychological	warfare,	spreading	disinformation	and	false	rumors	intended	to	harm	relationships	between	organizations,	and	even	occasionally	assassinations.	There	was	no	boundary	the	agency	would	not	cross	to	suppress	activists	and	leftist	organizations.	One	example	of	their	tactics	was	the	supply	of	false	information	to	the	Black	Panther	Party	and	the	Weathermen	so	that	the	two	would	no	longer	collaborate	on	any	protest	activities.	This	operation	lasted	until	1971	when	the	general	public	became	aware	of	the	FBI’s	illegal	actions.	During	this	short	period	of	time,	COINTELPRO	ravaged	civil	rights	groups	and	sabotaged	many	organizations,	the	Black	Panthers	being	just	one	such	example.	By	using	COINTELPRO	tactics,	the	FBI	sought	to	“prevent	or	break	any	attempts	at	multiracial	solidarity,”89	so	that	multiple	organizations	could	not	work	together	to	achieve	governmental	change.		 Created	long	before	the	Weathermen,	COINTELPRO	began	in	1956	with	the	goal	of	dismantling	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	and	the	Communist	Party.	The	two	were	not	related	at	the	time,	but	through	this,	Hoover	sought	to	root-out	these	so-
                                               89	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	64.	
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called	‘enemies	of	the	state’	to	ensure	that	white,	capitalist	America	remained	unchanged.	Hoover	saw	the	creation	of	COINTELPRO	as	a	means	of	maintaining	order.	The	group	used	wiretapping	and	infiltration	to	keep	tabs	on	and	to	constantly	know	the	whereabouts	of	high-profile	African	American	leaders	like	Dr.	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.	and	Malcolm	X.	In	fact,	one	of	the	FBI’s	plans	was	to	use	harassment	to	get	Dr.	King	to	commit	suicide.90	However,	COINTELPRO	has	not	been	found	to	be	responsible	for	King’s	assassination.	The	assassination	of	Black	Panther	Fred	Hampton	by	the	Chicago	Police	in	late-1969	was	directly	connected	to	COINTELPRO,	as	well	as	the	murder	of	dozens	of	other	Black	Panthers.91		 One	of	COINTELPRO’s	most	important	targets	was	the	Black	Liberation	Movement.	Including	the	Black	Panthers	in	this	group,	the	FBI	started	targeting	African-American	radicals	in	August	of	1967.	They	wanted	to	counter	the	growing	unrest	in	African	American	neighborhoods	while	also	maintaining	white	supremacy	in	capitalist	America.	In	order	to	do	so,	they	used	a	wide	range	of	tactics	to	ensure	that	African	American	and	white	Leftist	groups	would	not	work	together.	The	counterintelligence	action	came	to	a	climax	in	December	of	1969	when	Fred	Hampton,	a	prominent	Black	Panther	leader,	was	murdered	in	a	COINTELPRO	plan	carried	out	by	a	Chicago	Police	division	named	the	Red	Squad.	The	Red	Squad	was	responsible	for	the	deaths	of	dozens	of	African-American	rebels	and	activists	between	the	years	1967	and	1969.92	To	some	extent,	the	FBI’s	plan	to	ruin	multiracial	solidarity	had	worked	and	there	were	quarrels	between	predominantly	
                                               90	Taylor	Branch,	Pillar	of	Fire:	America	in	the	King	Years	1963-65	(New	York,	NY:	Simon	&	Schuster	Paperbacks,	1999),	527-529.	91	Gilbert,	Love	and	Struggle,	84-85.	92	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	71.	
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white	organizations	like	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	and	African-American	groups	like	the	Black	Panthers.	Black	Liberation	activists	did	not	want	to	work	with	white	groups,	whom	they	saw	as	unwilling	to	give	up	authority	or	to	compromise.	This	was	one	of	COINTELPRO’s	successes,	coming	at	the	cost	of	many	murders.		 The	dramatic	difference	between	African-American	and	white	radical	organizations	was	the	high	rate	of	assassination	of	African-American	leadership.	White	leaders	tended	to	be	middle-class	and	that	gave	them	advantages.	They	were	protected	by	their	skin	color	and	their	middle-class	upbringing;	they	could	not	be	murdered	in	cold	blood	as	could	African-American	leaders	without	inciting	public	outrage.	The	white	organizers	understood	the	privilege	of	their	socioeconomic	status,	using	it	to	their	advantage	when	setting	up	demonstrations	like	the	Days	of	Rage.	Even	though	there	were	disagreements	between	the	Black	Panthers,	other	African-American	organizations,	and	the	Weathermen,	the	Weathermen	saw	themselves	as	being,	ultimately,	on	the	same	side	as	the	African-Americans	with	whom	they	were	bickering.	But	despite	having	many	of	the	same	goals—to	end	imperialism	in	America	and	in	so	doing,	banish	the	harmful	systemic	oppression	and	structural	violence	that	had	plagued	African-	Americans	and	other	ethnic	minorities	since	the	beginning	of	the	slave	trade—there	were	many	impediments	to	African-American	and	white	radicals	working	together.		 As	with	the	Black	Panthers,	COINTELPRO	began	collecting	information	and	trying	to	infiltrate	the	Weathermen	following	the	group’s	emergence	at	the	June	1969	SDS	Convention.	This	was	no	surprise;	it	had	been	monitoring	SDS	since	1962	when	the	Port	Huron	Statement	was	published.	But	the	takeover	of	SDS	by	the	radical	Weathermen	intensified	the	FBI’s	interest	in	student	radicalism	and	to	
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dismantle	revolutionary	plans	and	communist	ideology.	Although	COINTELPRO’s	actions	against	SDS	were	not	as	severe	as	their	blatant	acts	against	African-Americans,	their	actions	were	definitely	illegal.	In	June	of	1969,	former	FBI	Special	Agent,	William	E.	Dyson	Jr.,	was	assigned	to	the	case.	His	job	consisted	of	learning	all	there	was	to	know	about	the	Weathermen.	He	explained	to	an	interviewer	in	2008	that,	“I	watched	them	become	the	Weathermen!	I	was	with	them	when	they	became	the	Weathermen!”93	He	was	in	Chicago,	outside	of	the	June	1969	Convention	when	SDS	split,	and	was	also	responsible	for	monitoring	any	actions	by	Weathermembers	during	their	first	two	years	of	action,	particularly	violent	acts	like	the	Weathermen	bombings.	Dyson	recalls	that	after	every	bombing,	he	was	unable	to	catch	the	Weathermen	responsible	for	it,	“there	was	no	rule	book	on	how	to	do	these	investigations...we	couldn’t	solve	the	bombings.”94	He	and	the	rest	of	his	unit	continued	monitoring	the	Weathermen	until	COINTELPRO	was	shut	down	in	1971;	however,	the	FBI	continued	to	carefully	and	illegally	keep	an	eye	on	the	Weathermen,	and	constantly	tried	to	sabotage	the	organization,	even	when	the	radical	core	went	underground.	Despite	their	best	efforts,	there	was	not	“much	the	FBI	was	able	to	do	to	counter	the	Weathermen…	[FBI]	agents	tried	to	recruit	informants	who	might	signal	the	group’s	plans,	but	they	were	all	but	impossible	to	come	by.”95	The	pressures	from	COINTELPRO	may	have	given	an	extra	push	to	the	Weathermen’s	decision	to	protect	themselves	and	their	organization	by	going	
                                               93	“Interview	of	Former	Special	Agent	of	the	FBI	William	E.	Dyson,	Jr.	(1967-1998)	Interviewed	by	Stanley	A.	Pimentel	On	January	15,	2008.”	Interview	by	Stanley	A.	Pimentel,	28.	94	“Interview	of	Former	Special	Agent	of	the	FBI	William	E.	Dyson,	Jr.	(1967-1998),”	Interviewed	by	Stanley	A.	Pimentel,	37.	95	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	71.	
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underground.	This	decision	was	made	a	few	months	after	the	Days	of	Rage.	Dohrn	and	the	rest	of	the	leadership	gathered	the	active	Weathermen	members	for	a	meeting	in	Flint,	Michigan,	known	as	the	Flint	War	Council	to	go	into	hiding	in	order	to	be	able	to	promote	and	act	out	their	agenda.	This	meeting	in	December	1969,	drew	together	the	300	remaining	Weathermembers	and	consisted	of	discussing	what	actions	the	organization	should	take	next.	The	meeting	hall	in	Flint	was	adorned	with	posters	of	revolutionaries	such	as	Castro,	Guevara,	and	Ho	Chi	Minh,	as	well	as	“mug	shots	of	enemies	of	the	people,	including	Vice	President	Spiro	Agnew.”96	The	group	was	very	outspoken,	chanting	“EXPLODE!”	The	war	council	concluded	with	the	group	realization	that	they	would	be	safest	underground,	where	the	FBI	and	right-wing	supporters	could	not	find	them.	The	meeting	also	inadvertently	decided	the	fate	of	SDS,	which	was	only	a	shell	at	this	point.	In	January	1970,	the	SDS	National	Office	in	Chicago	was	officially	closed	by	the	Weathermen.	The	plan	to	turn	SDS	into	a	revolutionary	mass	organization	were	dropped	in	favor	of	developing	a	small,	narrow,	and	disciplined	revolutionary	organization.	After	the	meeting	in	Flint,	the	Weathermen	were	now	underground,	meaning	they	would	begin	a	new	phase	of	their	lives	in	hiding,	fugitives	who	would	not	resurface	until	the	end	of	the	1970s.		 A	little	over	a	year	later,	on	8	March,	1971,	a	governmental	building	was	broken	into	in	Media,	Pennsylvania.	The	building,	which	was	small	and	very	discrete-looking,	was	owned	by	the	FBI	and	housed	many	documents	on	the	secret	operations	that	went	on	inside	COINTELPRO.	The	burglars,	who	were	part	of	a	
                                               96	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	123.	
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group	called	the	Citizens’	Commission	to	Investigate	the	FBI,	broke	in	and	stole	over	1,000	documents	containing	information	on	COINTELPRO	missions.	Stealing	these	documents	was	a	serious	crime;	however,	the	Citizens’	Commission	had	been	right	in	suspecting	COINTELPRO.	The	documents	contained	evidence	of	many	illegal	dealings,	gross	misconduct,	and	details	on	COINTELPRO’s	infiltration	of	left-wing	organizations	across	the	board,	harassment,	and	murder	in	the	name	of	democracy.	The	damning	truth	was	out.	The	documents	contained	evidence	of	the	FBI	meddling	in	groups	like	the	Black	Panthers	and	wiretapping	the	Weathermen.	The	Commission	accepted	responsibility	for	carrying	out	an	illegal	operation,	while	at	the	same	time	expressing	their	disgust	that	the	FBI’s	“surveillance	activities	were	being	carried	out	on	a	regular	basis	against	‘groups	and	individuals	working	for	a	more	just,	humane,	and	peaceful	society.’”97	COINTELPRO	was	shut	down	immediately	and	some	agents	were	even	prosecuted.	As	the	Weather	Underground	had	suspected,	the	FBI	was	indeed	trying	to	infiltrate	them.	Though	the	threat	of	FBI	scrutiny	was	slightly	diminished,	the	Weathermen	did	not	come	up	from	living	and	operating	their	organization	underground.	They	remained	underground,	where	they	continued	to	bomb	locations	around	America	in	an	effort	to	send	their	anti-imperialist	message.			 Ultimately,	the	FBI	viewed	the	Weather	Underground	as	terrorists.	In	its	mind,	the	Weathermen	did	indeed	use	violence	to	induce	fear	in	non-combatant	civilians	in	order	to	promote	a	specific	political	agenda.	This	was	the	excuse	for	COINTELPRO:	that	radical	violence	had	to	be	put	to	an	end.	However,	the	sloppiness	
                                               97	James	Kirkpatrick	Davis,	Spying	on	America:	The	FBI’s	Domestic	Counterintelligence	
Program	(Westport,	CT:	Praeger	Publishers,	1992),	7.	
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of	the	FBI	to	conceal	the	COINTELPRO	operations	eventually	led	to	its	demise.	The	evidence	that	they	had	gathered	illegally	was	of	no	use	to	the	government	now.	Evidently,	the	Weathermen	had	stayed	the	course	of	their	violence,	and	did	not	allow	the	FBI	to	intercept	that.		
The	Greenwich	Village	Townhouse	Explosion	and	a	Change	in	Strategy	After	the	Weathermen	went	underground	in	early	1970,	they	remained	vigilant	of	the	FBI.	Nonetheless,	Dohrn,	Rudd,	and	other	leading	members	felt	that	staying	the	course	of	trying	to	spur	a	revolution	was	still	the	only	way	of	ending	US	imperialism.	On	6	March,	1970,	Ted	Gold,	Terry	Robbins,	and	Diana	Oughton	were	working	on	a	small	bomb	in	a	Greenwich	Village	townhouse	when	it	accidentally	exploded,	killing	them	in	the	process.	Cathy	Wilkerson	and	Kathy	Boudin	were	also	in	the	townhouse	at	the	time	but	survived.	Commonly	referred	to	by	former	members	of	Weather	and	historians	as	the	Greenwich	Village	Townhouse	Explosion,	the	events	of	that	day	changed	the	course	of	the	group	by	forever	altering	their	ideology.		Until	6	March,	1970,	those	in	the	Greenwich	Village	townhouse	(and	the	Weather	Underground	as	a	whole)	still	believed	in	their	original	message,	destroying	US	imperialism	through	violent	revolution	and	replacing	it	with	a	new	communist	government.	Terry	Robbins	was	the	only	member	in	the	townhouse	who	had	been	a	part	of	creating	the	Weathermen’s	manifesto;	however,	all	five	of	them	were	leading	members	of	the	organization	at	the	time,	a	part	of	the	New	York	collective.	Ted	Gold	had	been	Columbia’s	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	vice	chairman	and	Diana	Oughton,	who	was	from	a	very	wealthy	family,	was	one	of	the	
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few	influential	women	involved	with	Weather.	Cathy	Wilkerson,	whose	family	owned	the	townhome,	and	Kathy	Boudin	were	there	cleaning	up	the	rooms	before	Wilkerson’s	parents	returned	to	the	home	that	night.		That	fateful	morning,	Terry	Robbins	and	Diana	Oughton	were	in	the	basement	working	on	the	bomb	meant	for	a	police	event	at	Fort	Dix	in	nearby	New	Jersey.	Cathy	Wilkerson	recalls	that	“Terry	had	decided	that	[the	basement]	was	the	safest	place	to	work	on	the	devices.”98	Ted	Gold	left	the	townhouse	to	go	down	to	the	closest	drugstore	and	buy	cotton	balls.	Moments	after	Gold’s	return,	there	were	three	explosions,	the	first	explosion	went	off	at	11:55am,	shaking	the	home,	then	another	blast	seconds	afterward,	essentially	destroying	the	townhouse	completely.	The	“two	explosions	eviscerated	the	townhouse,	destroying	the	first	floor	and	blowing	a	great	hole	in	its	brick	facade;	above,	the	top	floors	hung	like	a	set	of	trembling	balconies,	ready	to	fall	at	any	moment.”99	Cathy	Wilkerson	says	she	and	Kathy	Boudin	were	in	different	rooms	of	the	top	floor	when	the	first	two	blasts	went	off.	Immediately	after	the	first,	Wilkerson	began	yelling	for	Boudin,	and	after	the	second,	coughing	through	the	thick	dust,	they	ran	from	the	townhouse	to	the	home	of	Susan	Wagner,	a	neighbor.	When	the	bomb	exploded,	Boudin	was	in	the	shower.	When	the	two	got	to	Wagner’s,	someone	gave	Boudin	a	blanket	because	she	was	still	soaking	wet	and,	more	importantly,	in	shock.	The	explosions	had	gone	off	so	quickly	that	the	two	women	could	only	think	to	escape	as	fast	as	possible.	A	third	explosion	finally	destroyed	everything	that	was	left	in	the	townhome.		
                                               98	Wilkerson,	Flying	Close,	345.	99	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	107.	
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After	Wilkerson	and	Boudin	got	out	of	the	almost	disintegrated	townhouse,	they	planned	to	escape	the	city	by	subway	train,	knowing	they	could	not	hide	out	with	their	neighbor	for	long.	The	police	were	arriving	and	were	sure	to	come	to	the	Wagner	house	seeking	witnesses.	The	fire	department	was	already	throwing	water	on	the	mess	when	Wilkerson	and	Boudin	were	escaping	the	neighborhood.	Wilkerson	writes,	“hoping	that	our	gender	and	the	color	of	our	skin	would	deflect	the	notice	of	the	subway	clerk,	the	two	of	us	went	through	the	turnstile	together	on	our	one	token.”100	They	had	once	again	gone	underground.		By	12:30pm,	“a	half	hour	after	the	explosions,	the	hollowed-out	skeleton	of	the	townhouse	was	engulfed	in	angry	flames,	spewing	thick	clouds	of	smoke	into	the	gray	sky.”101	Originally	it	was	thought	that	the	destruction	had	been	caused	by	a	gas	explosion,	but	the	authorities	soon	realized	that	there	had	been	explosive	material	in	the	basement	of	the	townhouse.	Identifying	Gold	and	Oughton	did	not	take	very	long	(only	a	matter	of	days),	but	because	there	was	relatively	nothing	left	of	Robbins,	he	was	not	identified	until	two	months	later	by	a	single	finger.	After	identifying	the	remains	of	Gold	and	Oughton,	the	police	concluded	that	this	had	been	a	Weatherman	“bomb	factory.”102	It	took	days	for	all	of	the	members	of	the	Weathermen	Organization	across	the	country	to	be	alerted,	but	when	they	were,	the	organization	descended	into	chaos.	Rudd	found	Boudin	with	Wilkerson	in	her	family’s	second	home,	hiding	from	authorities	after	fleeing	from	Greenwich	Village.	Bill	Ayers,	who	was	in	a	serious	
                                               100	Wilkerson,	Flying	Close,	348.	101	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	109.	102	Federal	Bureau	of	Investigation	(Chicago	office),	“Foreign	Influence.”	
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relationship	with	Diana	Oughton	at	the	time,	recalls	that	he	found	out	in	a	phone	booth	somewhere	across	the	country	days	later.103	Weathermen	members	were	in	shock	and	horror	at	the	loss	of	Robbins	and	Gold,	individuals	who	were	leading	figures	of	the	group	and	symbolized	strength	and	determination	for	the	cause.	Their	deaths	scared	non-leadership	members	and	hurt	participation	enough	to	bring	membership	down	significantly.104	Although	it	is	not	known	the	exact	number	of	members	who	dropped	out	of	the	group	after	the	explosion,	it	was	most	likely	about	half	of	their	membership.	This	forced	the	organization	to	consolidate	its	leadership,	which	afterward	would	leave	the	Weathermen	with	“150	or	so	members.”105	Despite	living	through	the	Vietnam	Conflict	and	having	the	violent	destruction	of	the	US	government	as	its	principal	aim,	the	group	was,	nevertheless,	unprepared	to	handle	the	loss	of	its	members.	The	loss	of	key	members	in	any	situation	would	harm	an	organization;	however,	Robbins,	Gold,	and	Oughton	symbolized	the	pinnacle	of	the	Weathermen	Organization.	This	severe	loss	within	the	leadership	worsened	organizational	problems,	such	as	membership	recruitment,	that	had	plagued	the	Weather	Underground	since	its	inception	after	the	Days	of	Rage.	Many	within	the	group	worried	that	further	loss	of	leadership	life	would	doom	their	mission	to	failure,	as	there	would	likely	be	large	scale	losses	of	normal	members	as	well.	However,	this	loss	of	life	was	something	that	should	have	been	expected.	The	Weathermen	wanted	a	violent	revolution,	and	violent	revolutions	often	result	in	pain	and	death.	“This	is	what	the	Vietnamese	[were]	being	subjected	
                                               103	Ayers,	Fugitive	Days,	195.	104	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	129.	105	Varon,	Bringing	the	War	Home,	172.	
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to	every	day;”	unfortunately,	“this	is	the	ugliness	of	violence.”106	But	the	Weathermen	could	not	handle	this.	After	the	explosion,	the	leadership	of	the	Weather	Underground	was	reduced	and	renamed	the	Central	Committee.	This	Committee	consisted	of	Dohrn	at	the	helm,	Mark	Rudd	(who	would	soon	be	pushed	out),	J.J.,	Jeff	Jones,	and	Bill	Ayers.	Their	exact	positions	within	the	leadership	were	not	recorded.	They	led	the	Weather	Underground	from	different	posts	around	the	country	in	secret,	with	one	leader	controlling	each	location.		For	the	Weather	Underground,	the	townhouse	explosion	confirmed	the	decision	to	go	underground	and	become	an	anonymous	network	of	individuals	across	the	country,	devoted	to	stopping	the	Vietnam	Conflict	and	crippling	US	imperialism.	By	March	1970,	that	process	had	been	going	on	for	months.	Hoover	and	the	FBI	called	for	the	arrest	of	the	Weathermen	then	more	often	than	ever.		Most	importantly,	the	townhouse	event	precipitated	a	shift	in	strategy	for	the	Weathermen	Underground.	The	group	“defined	the	greatest	error	to	be	its	own	political	thinking	and	attitude,	rather	than	just	the	bomb’s	inadvertent	detonation	or	the	group's	technical	inexperience.”107	The	Central	Committee	decided	in	the	middle	of	March	1970	that	they	would	no	longer	target	human	beings	with	their	violence.	Instead,	they	would	bomb	buildings	only	after	warning	people	to	evacuate	the	location.	The	new-found	path	to	de-escalate	violence	shifted	Weather	strategy	from	full-fledged	revolution	to	symbolic	expressions	of	anger	and	outrage.	The	Weathermen	believed	that	this	would	open	the	eyes	of	the	government	to	the	terror	
                                               106	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	111.	107	Berger,	Outlaws	in	America,	130. 
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for	which	it	was	responsible	on	a	daily	basis	in	Vietnam,	prompting	the	US	to	pull	out	of	Southeast	Asia	for	good.	It	was	clear	that	their	intention	was	violence	without	death.	In	fact,	after	the	incident	in	Greenwich,	not	a	single	death	was	caused	by	the	Weathermen.		The	Weather	Underground	went	from	fearlessly	threatening	to	violently	destroying	the	country	in	the	name	of	anti-imperialism	no	matter	the	cost	to	vowing	never	to	harm	a	human	being.	The	reasons	for	this	include	more	than	the	Greenwich	Village	townhouse	explosion.	The	Chicago	Days	of	Rage	highlighted	the	inexperience	of	the	group	when	it	came	to	rallying	the	working-class,	showed	their	short-sightedness,	lack	of	knowledge	of	the	American	lower-class,	and	overconfidence.	The	best	example	of	these	faults	was	their	uninformed	belief	that	tens	of	thousands	would	show	up	to	join	them	in	Chicago.	There	cannot	be	a	revolution	without	revolutionaries.	The	Weathermen	knew	this	quite	well,	having	witnessed	failed	communist	revolutions	in	countries	across	the	globe;	however,	it	was	the	communist	victories—Che	Guevara’s	victory	in	Cuba	for	example—that	kept	them	going.	The	Weathermen	leadership	believed	that	if	they	could	gain	the	support	of	non-student	working-class	Americans,	revolution	would	be	not	only	possible,	but	inevitable.	The	Days	of	Rage	proved	to	Weatherleaders	like	Dohrn	and	Rudd	that	they	were	going	to	have	a	much	tougher	time	winning	popular	support	than	they	had	previously	anticipated.	The	failure	of	that	four-day	protest	had	already	demonstrated	the	need	for	a	shift	in	ideology;	however,	the	Weathermen	continued	on,	determined	that	things	would	change,	still	believing	in	their	original	message	in	their	Manifesto.		
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The	Days	of	Rage	marked	the	first	turning	point	in	the	course	of	the	Weathermen’s	trajectory	and	the	townhouse	explosion	marked	the	second.	The	townhouse	explosion	hit	the	Weathermen	where	they	cared	most,	their	own	members,	making	their	decision	to	change	ideology	an	emotional	one.	The	feeling	of	loss	created	by	the	deaths	of	three	important	leaders	elicited	a	reaction	that	had	not	been	foreseen	by	the	group’s	leadership;	emotional	tragedy	and	loss	are	the	easiest	and	most	logical	explanation	for	this	drastic	shift	in	ideology.	Mark	Rudd	recalled	his	immediate	reaction	of	anger	and	sadness	when	he	heard	who	had	died	in	the	townhouse,	“a	red	gash	split	open	in	time…	a	stillness	[that]	lasted	less	than	a	second,	an	eternity	before	the	pain	rushed	in…	I	was	face-to-face	with	a	loss	so	immense	that	it	dwarfed	everything	else,	yet	I	had	to	act.”108	He	knew	that	Robbins’s	leadership	had	been	a	problem	in	the	New	York	collective;	he	was	never	allowed	to	be	questioned	and	had	a	terrible	temper.	Robbins’s	actions	aside,	Rudd’s	emotionality	over	the	event	began	a	change	in	his	own	beliefs.	Realizing	the	cost	of	radical	violence,	the	Weathermen	no	longer	wanted	to	stay	a	violent,	revolutionary	course.	It	had	only	resulted	in	the	harming	of	their	own	members.	In	shifting	their	strategy	from	one	hellbent	on	a	violent	overthrow	of	capitalist	and	imperialist	hegemony	to	one	focused	on	staging	protests,	directed	at	symbols	of	capitalism	and	ruthless	power,	the	Weathermen	attempted	to	distance	themselves	from	terror	as	a	political	method.	They	no	longer	targeted	noncombatants,	having	never	actually	harmed	them.	Along	with	this,	they	were	not	technically	using	violence	to	induce	fear,	but	rather	to	change	government.	
                                               108	Rudd,	Underground,	195.	
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Through	the	loss	of	their	own	members	and	close	friends,	the	Weathermen	came	to	an	emotional	realization	that	using	terror	as	a	tactic	to	induce	fear	in	non-combatants	for	the	advancement	of	a	political	agenda	was	not	going	to	give	them	the	outcome	that	they	desired.	A	shift	to	symbolic	bombings	would	target	the	source	of	their	grievances:	the	US	government.	According	to	the	third	criterion	of	moral	justification	for	the	use	of	terror	specified	in	this	study,	directing	terrorist	activity	only	at	those	who	are	guilty	of	injustice	would	now	morally	justify	the	Weathermen,	if	one	were	to	still	argue	that	they	were	a	terrorist	organization.		 	
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CHAPTER	FOUR	A	HARD	RAIN’S	A-GONNA	FALL:	THE	WEATHER	UNDERGROUND	IN	ACTION	
Non-Lethal	Bombing	as	a	Strategy	(1970-1971)	After	the	explosion	at	the	Greenwich	Village	townhouse	and	the	Weathermen’s	decision	not	to	harm	anyone	again	with	one	of	their	bombs,	planning	began	for	when	and	where	their	next	detonation	would	occur.	The	leaders	who	remained	traveled	to	different	Weather	collectives	across	the	country	from	New	York	to	the	Midwest,	and	especially	on	the	West	Coast,	in	order	to	discuss	where	the	organization	would	go	from	there.	The	leading	members,	Ayers	and	Rudd,	ended	up	in	San	Francisco.	At	this	time,	many	within	the	Weather	Underground	were	disheartened	by	the	rapidly	declining	membership.	Dozens	of	members	left	without	any	notice.	The	leadership	assumed	that	those	who	were	not	responding	to	messages	had	lost	faith	in	the	group	and	abandoned	the	belief	that	they	could	ever	be	a	viable	competitor	to	the	United	States	government.	Dohrn	and	J.J.	were	already	in	San	Francisco,	heading	the	collective,	the	San	Francisco	Tribe,	that	had	been	working	out	of	there	from	the	beginning	of	1970	when	the	group	decided	to	go	underground.	Rudd	and	Ayers	soon	joined	them,	while	Wilkerson	and	Gilbert	stayed	somewhere	else	on	the	West	Coast,	although	their	exact	location	is	still	unknown.	Many	of	the	Weathermen	who	were	not	part	of	the	main	leadership	have	never	disclosed	where	they	were	at	this	time,	especially	those	who	had	been	in	New	York	at	the	time	of	the	townhouse	explosion.	Ayers	makes	the	comparison	that	their	“lives	underground,	in	outward	form	at	least,	resembled	the	lives	of	a	generation—moving	from	place	to	place,	extending	
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childhood	indefinitely,	entering	and	ending	relationships,	experimenting	with	love	and	work	and	all	manner	of	ways	of	being.”109	With	this	he	argues	that	at	this	time,	the	Weathermen	were	just	an	extension	of	the	counterculture	that	birthed	them.	He	also	makes	life	underground	sound	like	a	serene	break	from	a	capitalist	above	ground.	That	being	said,	life	underground	was	not	always	peaceful.		Then,	in	a	bombshell	announcement,	Dohrn	announced	that	J.J.	had	been	expelled	from	the	Weathermen	and	that	Mark	Rudd	had	been	demoted.	His	role	in	the	organization	was	lowered	to	the	spotter,	the	member	who	would	find	the	best	place	to	lay	the	bomb.	According	to	Rudd,	Dohrn	explained	that	J.J.	needed	to	“go	out	on	his	own…	to	learn	about	the	emerging	youth	culture	and	‘to	get	his	head	straight.’”110	It	is	likely	that	Rudd’s	close	friendship	with	J.J.	caused	his	own	fall	in	the	Weatherman	ranks	and	his	eventual	exile	from	the	Weatherman	leadership.111	The	year	1970	brought	about	change	in	Rudd’s	viewpoint.	He	became	much	less	violent	in	his	pursuits,	likely	a	result	of	his	loss	of	faith	that	the	working-class	would	ever	join	with	the	Weathermen	in	creating	a	revolution.	During	the	first	year	underground,	looking	back,	Mark	Rudd	writes	about	a	feeling	of	overall	disillusionment	and	the	loneliness	of	being	on	the	run,	explaining	that	he	was	“unhappy	and	cynical,”	and	began	“sinking	deeper	and	deeper	into	depression”	by	the	latter	half	of	1970.112	The	longer	he	was	underground,	the	more	discontent	boiled	within	him	towards	a	leadership	that	was	beginning	to	push	him	out	of	the	organization.	On	the	other	hand,	Gilbert,	whose	exact	location	was	unknown	at	this	
                                               109	Ayers,	Fugitive	Days,	222.	110	Rudd,	Underground,	214.	111	Rudd,	Underground,	214.	112	Rudd,	Underground,	219,231.	
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time,	says	his	time	underground	was	“almost	like	living	in	a	fairy	tale.	Contrary	to	the	common	misconception,	[he]	didn’t	feel	paranoid…	wasn’t	constantly	looking	over	[his]	shoulder.”113	Other	members	write	of	their	mixed	feelings	towards	living	underground.	Ayers	also	looks	back	on	the	early	1970s	fondly,	even	after	losing	Diana	Oughton	in	the	Greenwich	Townhouse	Explosion,	writing	that	he	and	Dohrn	“fell	in	love	slowly	in	that	first	year”	underground.114	All	of	the	Weathermen	took	on	aliases	when	they	went	underground,	Dohrn	went	by	the	name	Rose	Bridges	and	Ayers,	by	Joe	Brown.	He	describes	the	transition	as	shedding	his	former	identity	“like	an	old	skin,”	saying,	“someone	had	called	out	Bill	in	a	crowded	room	in	those	years,	I	wouldn’t	have	even	looked	up.”115	Everything	was	“need-to-know,”116	wrote	Ayers,	which	may	have	made	things	somewhat	unorganized,	but	the	leadership	did	not	find	this	concerning.	All	of	the	members	lived	very	modestly	and,	even	though	they	were	sometimes	funded	heavily	by	their	own	family	members	or	wealthy	connections,	they	were	not	the	privileged,	upper-class	children	that	the	media	tended	to	portray	them	as.	Most	of	the	money	they	were	given	went	towards	the	planning	and	carrying	out	of	bombings	across	the	country.	The	organization	seemed	to	have	hit	its	stride,	acting	against	the	government	of	the	United	States	in	the	name	of	anti-imperialism	and	anti-racism.	Even	more	encouraging	for	the	group:	they	were	
                                               113	Gilbert,	Love	and	Struggle,	167.	114	Ayers,	Fugitive	Days,	218.	115	Ayers,	Fugitive	Days,	218.	116	Ayers,	Fugitive	Days,	218.	
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getting	away	with	it.	However,	they	were	still	not	gaining	any	working-class	followers.	Meanwhile,	student	resistance	to	the	Vietnam	Conflict	was	reaching	a	height	it	had	never	before	seen.	On	4	May,	1970,	shots	were	heard	around	the	world	when	the	National	Guard	opened	fire	on	students	who	were	protesting	the	looming	invasion	of	Cambodia	at	Kent	State	University	in	Ohio.	Four	students	were	killed,	and	even	more	were	injured.	Campuses	erupted	in	revolt	by	students	who	were	horrified	that	their	own	country	had	resorted	to	murdering	its	youth.	The	Weathermen,	equally	disgusted	by	these	events,	saw	an	opportunity.	They	had	been	planning	a	bombing	since	the	townhouse	explosion	and	now	wanted	to	make	the	forthcoming	detonation	a	tribute	to	the	students	who	had	been	murdered.	The	site	chosen	was	on	the	West	Coast;	however,	when	they	tried	to	detonate	it,	it	did	not	go	off.	The	young	radicals	had	no	choice	but	to	responsibly	(and	anonymously)	call	authorities	so	that	the	bomb	could	be	safely	defused.	The	Weathermen	had	planned	on	this	bombing	being	their	first	major	event	since	the	townhouse	explosion.	Instead,	they	settled	for	a	release	of	their	first	communique.		The	Weathermen	used	the	communique,	released	on	21	May	1970,	to	officially	declare	war	on	the	United	States	government.	Their	first	communique	began	with	a	hello	from	author	Bernardine	Dohrn,	proving	that	she	was	still	alive	and	had	so	far	eluded	capture	by	the	FBI.	The	statement	said	that	“black	people	[had]	been	fighting	almost	alone	for	years,”	and	that	their	job	was	now	“to	lead	
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white	kids	into	armed	revolution.”117	It	further	discussed	the	influence	of	Che	Guevara,	how	he	had	opened	their	eyes	to	the	fact	that	“revolutionaries	move	like	fish	in	the	sea,”	and	that	the	“alienation	and	contempt	that	young	people	[now	had]	for	this	country	[had]	created	the	ocean”	for	the	revolution.118	The	communique	further	declared	that	the	Weathermen	would	live	peacefully	underground,	refusing	to	let	a	single	human	being	get	killed	by	one	of	their	bombs	ever	again.	Their	targets	would	now	be	locations	and	infrastructure	that	symbolized	the	capitalist,	imperialist	American	government.	The	communique	immediately	put	the	Weathermen	back	on	the	FBI’s	radar.	They	had	been	unable	to	locate	the	Weathermen	after	the	chaos	of	the	Greenwich	Village	explosion	and	those	who	went	underground	seemed	to	remain	one	step	ahead	of	the	FBI	throughout	the	1970s.		About	two	weeks	later,	on	9	June,	the	Weathermen	detonated	a	bomb	at	the	New	York	City	Police	Headquarters,	calling	this	a	response	to	police	oppression	of	African-Americans.	This	was	actually	the	Weather	Underground’s	first	successful	detonation	and	marked	an	important	moment	for	the	group.	Gilbert	says	that	according	to	newspaper	reports,	“the	device	had	been	placed	in	a	locker	room	and…	seven	employees	sustained	minor	injuries	from	shattered	glass.”119	By	alerting	the	police	headquarters	that	they	were	going	to	bomb	the	location,	almost	everyone	had	time	to	evacuate	safely	before	it	detonated.	The	Weather	Underground	most	likely	targeted	New	York	City	because	it	was	one	of	the	only	cities	on	the	East	Coast	in	which	Weathermembers	were	still	living.	By	this	time,	most	members	were	living	on	
                                               117	Weatherman/Weather	Underground	Organization,	“Communique	#1,”	May	21,	1970,	Links	to	Resources	from	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS)	and	Related	Groups	and	Activities,	accessed	May,	2017,	http://www.sds-1960s.org/sds_wuo/weather/wuo_communique_1.txt.	118	Weatherman/Weather	Underground	Organization,	“Communique	#1.”	119	Gilbert,	Love	and	Struggle,	161.	
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the	West	Coast	in	or	outside	San	Francisco.	Others	were	in	Chicago,	and	the	rest	of	the	reported	members	were	in	New	York	City.	It	has	never	been	reported	that	Weathermen	were	living	anywhere	other	than	these	three	areas	during	the	1970s.	To	accompany	the	bomb,	the	Weathermen	issued	their	second	communique.	This	pattern	would	be	repeated	throughout	1970:	they	would	detonate	a	bomb,	then	claim	responsibility	through	a	communique	and	explain	more	specifically	why	they	blew	up	a	certain	location.	Communique	#2	came	with	the	title	“Damage	and	Injuries	at	This	Time—Details	Later.”	The	letter	explained	that	the	police	headquarters	was	symbolic	of	the	Weathermen’s	enemies—all	police—and	that	this	bomb	was	meant	to	protest	the	ongoing	violence	that	police	imposed	on	minorities	and	youth	in	America.	The	group	also	used	this	bombing	to	express	outrage	over	the	Kent	State	massacre.	The	communique	ended	with	the	statement	“the	time	is	now.	Political	power	grows	out	of	a	gun,	a	Molotov,	a	riot,	a	commune…	and	from	the	soul	of	the	people,”	calling	upon	working-class	and	youth	to	act	in	the	name	of	socialism.120	The	Weather	Underground	detonated	their	next	bomb	on	16	July,	1970	at	the	Presidio	Army	base	in	California,	to	mark	the	eleventh	anniversary	of	the	Cuban	Revolution.	They	used	the	anniversary	to	assert	their	viewpoint	that	revolution	was	still	possible.	It	also	stood	as	a	reminder	that	the	Weathermen	were	everywhere,	coast	to	coast,	and	showed	that	the	FBI	could	not	catch	them,	despite	having	the	funds	and	resources	of	the	US	government	behind	the	search.	Immediately	they	
                                               120	Weatherman/Weather	Underground	Organization,	“Communique	#2,”	June	9,	1970,	Links	to	Resources	from	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS)	and	Related	Groups	and	Activities,	accessed	May,	2017,	http://www.sds-1960s.org/sds_wuo/weather/wuo_communique_2.txt.	
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issued	their	third	communique,	which	stated	that	“hundreds	of	thousands	of	freaks	plot	to	build	a	new	world	on	the	ruins	of	honky	America.”121	By	the	phrase	“hundreds	of	thousands	of	freaks,”	the	Weathermen	meant	that	collectively,	alongside	third-world	parties,	the	rejected	socialist	youth	of	America	could	destroy	the	imperialist	United	States.	They	ended	the	letter	with	a	jab	at	the	authorities	who	were	looking	for	them	by	saying,	“don’t	look	for	us…	we’ll	find	you	first.”122	About	two	months	later,	between	the	first	and	second	weeks	of	September	1970,	the	Weathermen	successfully	helped	famous	LSD	advocate	Timothy	Leary	escape	from	Folsom	Prison	and	were	paid	the	sum	of	$20,000.	It	is	not	reported	who	paid	them	this	amount	of	money;	however,	it	undoubtedly	went	a	long	way	for	the	group.	The	Weathermen	were	certainly	advocates	of	Leary’s	writings	and	research,	as	Leary	was	a	leftist,	siding	with	other	socialist	thinkers	on	many	issues.	This	caper	proved	to	be	as	important	a	symbol	as	a	bomb	would	have	been,	showing	that	the	organization	was	capable	of	doing	anything	and	everything,	and	at	any	time.	It	also	expressed	backlash	towards	the	social	control	of	illegal	drug	use.	The	Weathermen	were	known	for	their	free	use	of	drugs,	as	were	many	anti-war	and	youth	groups	at	the	time.	After	Leary’s	escape,	the	fourth	Weathermen	communique,	written	by	Dohrn	stated	that	“LSD	and	grass,	like	the	herbs	and	cactus	and	mushrooms	of	the	American	Indians	and	countless	civilizations	that	have	existed	on	this	planet,	will	help	us	make	a	future	world	where	it	will	be	possible	to	live	in	peace.”123	The	
                                               121	Weatherman/Weather	Underground	Organization,	“Communique	#3,”	July	31,	1970,	Links	to	Resources	from	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS)	and	Related	Groups	and	Activities,	accessed	May,	2017,	http://www.sds-1960s.org/sds_wuo/weather/wuo_communique_3.txt.	122	Weatherman/Weather	Underground	Organization,	“Communique	#3.”	123	Weatherman/Weather	Underground	Organization,	“Communique	#4,”	September	18,	1970,	Links	to	Resources	from	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society	(SDS)	and	Related	Groups	and	
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Weathermen	expressed	their	commitment	to	freeing	“prisoners	of	war”	like	Leary,	who	had	been	“held	against	his	will	and	the	will	of	millions	of	kids”	in	America.124125	The	Weathermen	would	continue	to	back	prisoners	who	they	believed	were	being	wrongfully	held	behind	bars,	standing	behind	the	prison	movement	of	the	1970s	that	argued	against	the	unjust	policies	that	put	a	disproportionately	large	number	of	African-American	men	behind	bars	than	whites	convicted	of	the	same	crime.	This	was	also	the	last	event	that	Mark	Rudd	participated	in,	as	he	officially	left	the	group	shortly	after,	but	remained	underground	until	1976.	After	helping	Leary	escape	from	prison,	Rudd	became	more	and	more	disillusioned	with	the	Weather	Underground.	He	no	longer	held	a	leadership	position	and	did	not	enjoy	life	underground	as	some	other	members	did.	Feeling	alone	and	isolated,	Rudd	could	no	longer	stand	being	a	part	of	a	group	that	no	longer	valued	his	participation.	It	was	his	disagreement	with	leadership	that	pushed	him	away	from	the	organization	he	helped	to	found.	Rudd	has	not	written	about	what	exactly	he	disagreed	with	when	it	came	to	the	Weathermen’s	ideology	and	methods;	however,	he	discusses	being	disenchanted	with	Dohrn	and	Ayers	and	blames	his	leaving	on	himself,	feeling	that	he	had	failed	by	doubting	the	group	and	that	he	was	not	committed	enough	to	the	revolution.126	He	wanted	time	to	be	outside	of	the	organization	and	reassess	what	he	believed	in.		
                                               Activities,	accessed	May,	2017,http://www.sds-1960s.org/sds_wuo/weather/wuo_communique_4.txt.	124	Weatherman/Weather	Underground	Organization,	“Communique	#4.”	125	This	is	the	final	Weathermen	communique	found.	It	is	not	known	whether	or	not	there	are	more;	however,	it	is	unlikely.	126	Rudd,	Underground,	230-231.	
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The	two	bombings	that	concluded	the	Weathermen’s	1970	campaign	came	on	the	same	day:	8	October,	1970.	The	targets	were	two	different	locations,	each	with	its	own	specific	purpose	and	meaning.	First,	they	detonated	a	bomb	at	the	Queens	Courthouse	in	New	York	in	solidarity	with	the	New	York	prison	revolts	that	had	recently	begun.	The	second	bomb	was	set	off	at	the	Harvard	Center	for	International	Affairs	to	protest	continued	American	involvement	in	the	Vietnam	Conflict.	It	was	yet	another	reminder	to	the	federal	authorities	that	the	Weather	Underground	were	in	multiple	cities	and	could	gain	access	into	any	building	they	wanted	to	target.	The	Harvard	detonation	astonished	many	members	of	the	media	and	public	as	it	took	place	at	an	educational	institution,	especially	one	in	which	their	mother	organization,	Students	for	a	Democratic	Society,	had	developed.	One	could	argue	that	to	the	Weathermen,	an	institution	like	Harvard	symbolized—just	as	Columbia	had	in	1968—the	elitism	that	the	organization	wanted	to	tear	down.	Before	the	end	of	1970,	the	Weathermen	carried	out	one	more	action,	one	that	was	non-violent	in	nature.	They	released	a	statement	entitled	“New	Morning”	on	6	December.	It	was	sent	to	those	in	the	underground	media	that	they	felt	“closest	to,”	and	expressed	the	continued	determination	of	the	group	to	fight	against	American	imperialism	and	the	overwhelming	dominance	of	capitalist	ideology.	They	further	said:	“[the]	townhouse	[explosion]	forever	destroyed	our	belief	that	armed	struggle	is	the	only	real	revolutionary	struggle.”127	They	describe	the	motive	for	their	shift	in	strategy	as	coming	with	the	knowledge	that	this	new	path	would	keep	them	morally	above	the	government	whose	actions	they	so	opposed,	a	government	
                                               127	Weather	Underground	Organization,	“New	Morning.”	Off	Our	Backs	1,	no.	18	(February	26,	1971).	Accessed	January	2018,	6.	
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that	was	still	murdering	innocent	civilians	in	Vietnam	and	Southeastern	Asia	every	day.	The	Weathermen	statement	implied	that	revolutionary	culture	could	include	violence	not	targeted	towards	human	beings,	that	symbolic	actions	were	just	as	important	and	effective,	if	not	more	so,	than	the	death	count.	Near	the	end	of	the	statement,	the	Weathermen	attest	that	the	“hearts	of	[their]	people	are	in	a	good	place,”	and	that	they	were	“building	different	kinds	of	leaders	and	organizations	throughout	the	country,”	that	would	become	a	New	Nation,	band	together,	fighting	in	the	coming	year.128	The	entire	piece	was	a	symbol	of	hope	by	and	for	the	Weathermen.	The	title	showed	this	in	invoking	a	new	dawn	on	the	horizon,	a	new	morning	that	would	awaken	Americans	across	the	country	to	rise	up	and	become	a	part	of	the	revolution.	The	first	bombing	in	1971	did	not	come	until	28	February.	It	was	one	of	the	most	famous	bombings	by	the	Weathermen	Organization:	the	bombing	of	the	US	Capitol	Building	to	protest	the	American	invasion	of	Laos,	a	country	neighboring	Vietnam	and	Cambodia.	It	could	be	argued	that	their	success	proved	that	the	Weathermen	still	remained	at	large	and	capable	of	penetrating	even	the	most	highly	regarded	and	well-secured	government	buildings.	It	showcased	the	skill	and	precision	of	the	organization,	able	to	blow	up	a	wing	of	the	ultimate	symbol	of	capitalism,	still	without	harming	a	single	human	being.	This	took	an	incredible	amount	of	planning,	which	could	explain	why	there	is	such	a	gap	in	Weatherman	activity	for	months.	
                                               128	Weather	Underground	Organization,	“New	Morning,”	7.	
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After	the	bombing	of	the	Capitol,	the	Weathermen	detonated	only	one	more	bomb	that	year.	This	came	months	later	on	17	September	at	the	New	York	Department	of	Corrections.	It	expressed	outrage	over	the	murder	of	twenty-nine	inmates	at	Attica	State	Penitentiary.	The	murder	of	famous	African-American	activist	George	Jackson	by	prison	guards	proved	to	be	the	catalyst	“for	the	biggest	and	most	dramatic	prison	rising	in	U.S.	history.”129	The	Weathermen,	who	had	backed	the	prison	reform	movement	since	its	infancy	and	dedicated	a	previous	bomb	in	October	of	1970	to	it,	believed	that	this	action	would	add	to	the	revolt	and	show	the	public	that	there	was	an	ally	working	in	the	prisoners’	interest	outside	prison	walls.		The	Weather	Underground	did	not	resume	bombing	until	May	of	1973.	The	delay	was	caused	by	money	problems	and	also	internal	reorganization.	Being	on	the	run	from	the	FBI’s	counterintelligence	program	proved	to	be	expensive.	Although	they	returned	to	the	tactic	of	bombing	in	1973	and	did	not	detonate	their	final	bomb	until	mid-1975,	it	was	apparent	at	this	time	that	the	Weather	Underground	was	losing	steam.	They	were	never	more	active	than	during	the	years	1970	and	1971,	with	the	year	1970	seeing	more	bombings	than	any	other	year.			
Final	Years	Underground	(1972-1975)		 After	the	chaotic	first	two	years	of	the	Weathermen’s	underground	action,	the	year	1972	seemed	to	observers	above	ground	like	a	stagnant	break	for	the	organization;	however,	this	was	not	entirely	the	case.	Although	there	was	only	one	
                                               129	Gilbert,	Love	and	Struggle,	180-181.	
 76	
bombing	the	entire	year,	the	Weathermen,	in	fact,	kept	themselves	quite	busy.	Working	with	a	small	remnant	of	about	fifteen	members,	a	stark	contrast	to	the	roughly	150	who	went	underground	in	1970,	they	continued	to	trudge	on	with	revolutionary	struggle	that	they	still	thought	to	be	achievable	through	symbolic	violence.			 For	the	Weathermen,	the	year	1972	consisted	of	constant	traveling	and	negotiating.	The	dismal	size	of	their	group	required	them	to	seek	funding	and	help	from	other	revolutionary	and	leftist	groups	around	the	country.130	The	organization,	still	being	wanted	as	fugitives	of	the	law	by	the	FBI,	would	travel	discreetly	with	their	fake	names	and	identification.	Which	exact	groups	they	met	with	are	unknown;	however,	they	used	these	meetings	not	only	to	request	cash,	but	to	make	up	with	organizations	from	which	they	had	once	cut	themselves	off.	As	a	result,	the	Weathermen	tried	to	build	back	many	of	the	bridges	that	they	had	once	burned.		 The	Weathermen	also	spent	this	time	anonymously	living	among	the	counterculture.	David	Gilbert	remembers	taking	on	a	part-time	job	during	1972	to	make	ends	meet,	recounting,	“I	worked	bagging	groceries,	and	the	union	medical	plan	afforded	me	some	long	neglected	dental	work…	The	twenty-five	hours	a	week	at	the	job	had	the	benefit	of	talking	with	and	learning	more	about	the	lives	and	ideas	of	other	workers.”131	Returning	to	the	above-ground	world	in	a	more	relaxed,	working-class	lifestyle,	provided	the	Weathermen	with	stability	and	a	chance	to	interact	with	the	working	men	and	women	whom	they	claimed	to	champion.	It	
                                               130	Gilbert,	Love	and	Struggle,	193.	131	Gilbert,	Love	and	Struggle,	193.	
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provided	them	with	the	opportunity	to	reconnect	with	the	class	that	the	organization	had	once	called	on	for	support	a	little	over	three	years	before.			 Other	than	making	connections	with	outside	groups	across	the	country,	the	Weathermen	set	off	one	single	bomb	on	19	May,	1972,	and	although	it	was	the	only	one	of	the	year,	the	location	captured	enough	recognition	to	last	until	their	next.	“Everything	was	absolutely	ideal	on	the	day	I	bombed	the	Pentagon,”	attests	Bill	Ayers	in	his	memoirs,	“the	sky	was	blue.	The	birds	were	singing.	And	the	bastards	were	finally	going	to	get	what	was	coming	to	them.”132	Much	like	the	bombing	of	the	US	Capitol,	the	bombing	of	the	Pentagon	made	a	lasting	impression.	It	was	one	of	the	three	Weathermen	“dream	targets”	(the	others	being	the	Capitol	and	the	White	House).	Americans	could	not	believe	that	the	small	group	of	Weathermen	were	able	to	scope	out	the	perfect	spot:	a	woman’s	bathroom	in	the	Air	Force	wing.	Even	though	the	Pentagon	is	a	busy	place,	like	all	of	their	other	bombings,	no	one	was	killed.	The	date	was	also	significant,	as	it	was	the	birthday	of	deceased	North	Vietnamese	leader	Ho	Chi	Minh.	The	Weathermen	claimed	that	the	bomb	was	for	both	this	reason	and	retaliation	for	the	recent	US	bombing	of	Hanoi.	After	the	bombing,	the	Weathermen	would	be	silent	until	almost	exactly	a	year	later	in	1973,	giving	them	time	to	travel	and	regroup.	During	this	short	break,	with	no	significant	FBI	information	on	where	members	were	located,	the	government	assumed	the	group	had	disbanded.	“For	Weather	to	give	up	bombings	all	together,	however,	would	be	to	disavow	everything	it	had	achieved	to	that	point.”133	Thus,	they	adopted	a	new	plan:	fewer	bombings,	bigger	targets.	
                                               132	Ayers,	Fugitive	Days,	264.	133	Burrough,	Days	of	Rage,	231.	
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	 Two	more	bombings	were	carried	out	in	1973.	The	Weathermen	blew	up	the	103rd	precinct	in	New	York	on	18	May,	1973	in	response	to	the	police	murder	of	an	African-American	youth.	The	building	may	not	have	been	as	large	a	target	as	some	of	the	previous	ones,	but	it	was	a	symbol	of	systemic	violence	by	police	in	America.	The	operation	was	carefully	planned	over	a	period	of	months	by	the	remaining	members	of	the	New	York	Collective.		Four	months	later,	on	28	September,	1973,	the	organization	bombed	the	International	Telephone	&	Telegraph	(ITT)	Headquarters	in	New	York	in	response	to	the	US-backed	coup	in	Chile,	an	action	that	was	not	related	to	the	Vietnam	Conflict	in	any	way,	but	merely	to	communism.	The	bombing	was	one	of	the	Weather	Underground’s	new	“bigger	targets,”	and	they	took	pride	in	targeting	such	a	large	government	business.		Also,	during	this	year,	because	of	a	recent	US	Supreme	Court	ruling	making	it	illegal	for	the	government	to	use	information	in	court	that	had	been	gathered	by	illegal	and	unconstitutional	means,	the	government	formally	requested	to	have	most	of	the	charges	against	the	Weathermen	dropped.	There	was	no	longer	evidence	from	the	FBI’s	illegal	COINTELPRO	operations	that	could	be	used	against	Weathermembers.	This	meant	that	the	majority	of	the	members	and	former	members	still	underground	could	resurface	and	face	no	criminal	charges	or	any	jail	time.	The	US	Supreme	Court	proved	the	idea	that	“no	matter	how	much	one	may	disapprove	of	the	movement’s	morality	or	methods,	it	is	certain	that	those	who	protested	the	war	were	acting	within	the	unmistakable	guarantees	of	the	
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Constitution.”134	They	would	no	longer	be	held	criminally	responsible	for	actions	that	they	had	committed	during	the	period	1969	to	1971.	Nothing	from	years	after	1971	could	be	prosecuted	either,	because	the	Weathermen	were	never	caught	in	any	of	their	bombings.	However,	this	did	not	happen.		 A	little	less	than	six	months	later,	on	6	March,	1974,	the	Weathermen	set	off	a	bomb	at	the	Department	of	Health,	Education,	and	Welfare	Offices	in	San	Francisco,	another	big	target.	The	Weathermen	did	so	to	protest	the	forced	sterilization	of	lower	class	women	in	the	area.	It	can	be	argued	that	targeting	a	building	that	involved	government	functions	that	aided	the	working	and	middle-class	may	have	been	counterproductive;	however,	the	message	behind	the	bombing	was	to	call	attention	to	change	in	the	programs	that	were	meant	to	aid	the	lower	classes,	but,	at	the	time,	were	not	providing	enough	help.		Not	long	after,	the	Weathermen	would	release	new	literature,	designed	to	pull	in	a	more	Leninist	audience	in	a	new	post-Vietnam-Conflict	era.	Not	a	new	Manifesto,	but	more	of	an	addition	to	“New	Morning,”	Prairie	Fire	spoke	to	an	America	that	had	begun	to	remove	itself	from	a	disastrous	conflict	in	Vietnam,	and	although	the	last	US	troops	would	not	leave	Vietnam	for	almost	another	year,	the	entire	country	(and	much	of	the	world)	knew	that	the	fighting	was	coming	to	an	end.	The	left	was	on	the	verge	of	victory.	Prairie	Fire	extensively	discussed	the	nature	of	post-revolution	Vietnam,	and	how	new	radical	strategy	from	radical	groups	in	America	could	still	give	rise	to	a	tangible	revolution.	Abbie	Hoffman	even	publicly	endorsed	the	writing,	praising	the	message	the	Weathermen	were	sending	and	
                                               134	Davis,	Spying	on	America,	156.	
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saying	that	every	American	should	own	it.135	Released	on	9	May	1974,	the	document	of	more	than	150	pages	marked	a	new	phase	for	the	organization,	a	phase	in	which	they	believed	the	war	was	finally	coming	home.	The	document	highlights	this	by	stating,	“Watergate	is	a	magnificent	victory	of	the	struggles	of	the	60s,	a	reflection	of	the	war	coming	home.”136	The	turmoil	of	the	1970s	was	proving	to	be	“indicative	of	serious	and	fatal	weakness	in	the	system.”137	This	turmoil,	the	Weathermen	believed,	was	something	they	could	turn	into	a	revolution,	by	taking	a	different,	more	old-left	Leninist	approach	(a	result	of	the	recent	loss	in	Southeastern	Asia	and	conservative	political	disasters	like	Watergate	and	FBI’s	COINTELPRO	coming	to	light).	The	piece	would	guide	the	Weathermen’s	actions	into	the	later	1970s.	They	did	not	know,	however,	that	much	like	the	Vietnam	Conflict,	the	organization	would	soon	be	entering	into	a	slow	decline,	before	eventually,	a	gradual	fade	out.	On	31	May,	1974,	after	the	release	of	Prairie	Fire,	the	Weathermen	resumed	bombing.	This	was	both	another	protest	as	well	as	a	statement	of	intent	to	follow	through	with	what	they	had	outlined	in	their	latest	publication.	This	time	the	target	was	the	Office	of	the	California	Attorney	General;	the	group	intended	to	demonstrate	their	outrage	over	the	killing	of	six	Symbionese	Liberation	Army	(SLA)	members.	It	is	unknown	whether	or	not	the	Weathermen	had	any	connection	with	the	SLA	at	this	time,	although	it	is	unlikely	because	of	the	SLA’s	outward	opposition	to	the	Weathermen.	Much	like	the	Black	Panthers,	the	SLA	did	not	take	the	
                                               135	Marty	Jezer,	Abbie	Hoffman:	American	Rebel	(1992),	258-259.	136	Bernardine	Dohrn,	Bill	Ayers,	and	Jeff	Jones,	Sing	a	Battle	Song:	The	Revolutionary	Poetry,	
Statements,	and	Communique	of	the	Weather	Underground	1970-1974	(New	York:	Seven	Stories	Press,	2006),	257.	137	Dohrn,	Ayers,	Jones,	Sing	a	Battle	Song,	257.	
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Weathermen	seriously	as	a	revolutionary	group	and	did	not	believe	it	was	committed	to	real	struggle.		 The	next	bombing	credited	to	the	Weathermen	Underground	was	just	two	weeks	later	at	Gulf	Oil’s	Pittsburg	Headquarters	on	17	June,	1974,	to	protest	US	actions	in	Angola	in	which	the	company	was	directly	linked.	It	was	not	as	large	a	target	in	America	as	the	Pentagon,	Capitol,	or	ITT	Headquarters	had	been,	but	bombing	Golf	Oil	nevertheless	sent	a	message	to	the	large	corporations	that	benefited	from	military	escalation	in	an	American	capitalist	system.			 The	next	bombing	occurred	more	than	six	months	later,	on	28	January,	1975,	and	was	one	of	the	final	bombings	claimed	by	the	Weathermen.	It	took	place	at	the	US	State	Department,	and	one	can	argue	that	this	bombing	was	one	of	their	more	significant,	dwarfed	only	by	those	at	the	Capitol	and	the	Pentagon.	Although	the	Weathermen	would	never	be	able	to	complete	their	aforementioned	“dream	list”	of	top	three	targets,	they	came	quite	close.	This	bombing	came	in	response	to	final	escalation	in	Vietnam,	the	last	bit	of	fighting	that	was	conducted	before	American	troops	left	in	April.		 The	final	Weathermen	bomb	was	placed	in	the	Banco	de	Ponce	in	New	York	on	16	June,	1975,	two	months	after	America	had	completely	pulled	out	of	Vietnam.	The	organization	targeted	the	location	to	show	their	solidarity	with	Puerto	Rican	cement	workers	who	were	on	strike	at	the	time.138	It	served	as	the	perfect	example	of	how	removed	from	the	Vietnam	conflict	the	group	had	become	now	that	the	war	
                                               138	Berger,	Outlaws	of	America,	214.	
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had	ended.	This	final	bombing	would	signify	a	new	era	for	the	Weathermen,	one	of	disillusionment	and	abandoned	revolution.		
Resurfacing:	The	End	of	the	Weather	Underground	(1976	and	Later)		 The	16	June	bombing	in	1975	proved	to	be	the	final	bombing	by	the	Weathermen.	After	this,	the	Weathermen	remained	underground	for	seven	months	with	no	evidence	of	any	communiques	or	actions	of	any	sort.	As	1976	began	Weather	Underground	members	began	a	slow	transition	to	the	above	ground	world	they	once	knew.	The	bombing	was	over	and	despite	the	continued	dominance	of	US	imperialism	around	the	globe,	the	Vietnam	Conflict	was	over.	The	organization	had	been	setting	off	bombs	for	over	six	years,	and	contrary	to	their	original	goal,	their	bombs	did	not	result	in	the	ending	of	the	Vietnam	Conflict.	The	Weathermen	may	have	been	a	contributing	factor	in	some	sort,	but	if	so,	not	by	much.	They	had	few	followers	or	hardly	any	audience.	The	weakening	of	their	organization	led	to	the	only	possible	outcome:	a	slow	decline	of	the	organization	and	eventual	dissolution.	Between	1976	and	1980,	most	of	the	Weathermembers	who	had	gone	underground	resurfaced.	The	reemergence	of	some	is	not	documented,	simply	because	not	all	members	are	open	to	discussing	this	period	of	their	life,	but	many	were.	The	beginning	of	this	trend	began	with	Mark	Rudd	in	1976.	Rudd	may	not	have	been	the	very	first	member	or	former	member	to	resurface,	but	he	and	his	wife	Sue	were	the	first	to	document	their	transition	back	to	the	above	ground	world.	As	a	husband	and	father,	Rudd	could	not	imagine	facing	multiple	FBI	charges.	Quietly	living	in	New	York,	Rudd	describes	the	difficult	process,	stating	“my	biggest	worry	was	prison.	I	decided	that	I	could	handle	up	to	two	years’	time	if	I	had	to,	though	I	
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didn’t	know	how	I’d	cope	with	more.”139	He	was	pleased	to	learn	that	he	would	face	no	criminal	charges	because	all	of	the	evidence	against	him	was	judged	to	have	been	illegally	obtained	under	the	FBI’s	COINTELPRO	operation.	Shortly	after	Rudd’s	transition	back	to	a	normal	middle-class	life,	J.J.	resurfaced	as	well,	reconnecting	with	Rudd.140	J.J.	ended	up	living	in	New	York	with	Rudd	and	his	family	until	around	the	end	of	1976.	Thereafter,	Rudd	and	Sue	lived	quietly	and	peacefully	in	New	York.		For	Kathy	Wilkerson,	the	decision	to	return	to	a	middle-class	life	was	not	an	easy	one.	Wilkerson	made	the	decision	in	1979,	three	years	after	Rudd	and	his	wife.	She	and	Dohrn	had	been	the	leading	women	of	the	organization.	Giving	up	on	an	ideology	she	had	worked	to	promote	for	a	decade	was	not	something	that	she	had	envisioned.	After	years	underground,	she	wanted	to	come	back	to	an	above	ground	life	in	which	she	would	no	longer	be	on	the	run.	Her	memoirs	are	titled	Flying	Close	
to	the	Sun,	which	in	and	of	itself	is	an	illuminating	title,	for	she	knew	she	had	reached	the	peak	of	her	radicalization,	and	that	it	had	to	come	to	an	end.	Needing	a	way	to	survive	and	also	wanting	to	be	a	part	of	the	women’s	liberation	conversation,	she	believed	she	could	no	longer	remain	in	hiding.	As	Wilkerson	says	in	her	memoirs,	“I	realized	I	needed	to	be	a	part	of	a	broader	discussion	if	I	was	to	continue	to	reconstruct	new	ideas	about	change…	as	long	as	I	was	isolated	and	on	my	own,	I	would	never	be	able	to	even	afford	the	newspaper.”141	Resurfacing	just	before	Ayers	and	Dohrn	in	1979,	she	was	one	of	the	few	Weathermen	to	serve	jail	time.	After	prison,	Wilkerson	studied	electrical	engineering	technology,	believing	that	science	
                                               139	Rudd,	Underground,	290.	140	Rudd,	Underground,	280-284.	141	Wilkerson,	Flying	Close,	385.	
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and	math	were	essential	to	understanding	the	“critical	and	political	economic	decisions	of	the	day.”142	Most	of	the	members	who	resurfaced	during	this	period	(1976-1980)	only	received	small	fines	if	they	paid	any	penalty	at	all.	This	was	the	case	for	Bill	Ayers	and	Bernardine	Dohrn.	Although	this	sounds	surprising	given	the	fact	that	Dohrn	had	at	one	time	been	on	the	FBI’s	Top	Ten	Most	Wanted	list,	COINTELPRO	let	her	and	Ayers	off	the	hook	for	most	of	the	criminal	actions	they	had	committed.	Dohrn	and	Ayers	had	maintained	a	romantic	relationship	for	many	years,	and	like	Rudd,	they	had	a	small	child	to	consider	when	it	came	to	maintaining	a	life	underground.	In	1980,	the	couple	turned	themselves	in	to	authorities	in	Chicago.	Dohrn	faced	some	charges	and	even	some	prison	time,	but	ultimately	served	less	than	a	year	in	jail	before	returning	to	her	family	to	resume	a	middle-class	lifestyle	in	the	Midwest.			 Some	members	of	the	Weather	Underground	refused	to	give	up	on	the	group	or	their	goal	of	toppling	American	imperialism	easily.	David	Gilbert	was	one	of	these	cases.	He	argued	in	Love	and	Struggle	that	resurfacing	would	not	help	to	strengthen	the	movement,	but	rather,	would	tear	it	apart.	Eventually	realizing	he	could	not	save	the	organization,	he	joined	with	another	underground	group	of	white	activists	called	the	Revolutionary	Armed	Task	Force	(RATF).	In	October	of	1981,	RATF,	working	with	the	Black	Liberation	Army,	robbed	a	Brinks	secure	money	transporting	vehicle	in	New	York.	The	robbery	got	out	of	hand	and	the	ordeal	resulted	in	a	shootout.143	Gilbert,	being	an	accessory	to	this	crime,	has	been	in	prison	ever	since,	not	eligible	for	parole	until	2056.	Even	though	the	robbery	was	not	tied	to	the	Weathermen	in	
                                               142	Wilkerson,	Flying	Close,	387.	143	Gilbert,	Love	and	Struggle,	277-278.	
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any	way,	from	prison,	Gilbert	has	released	multiple	books	on	the	Weathermen	and	his	involvement	in	the	group,	as	well	as	starred	alongside	Dohrn,	Ayers,	Rudd,	and	other	members	in	a	Weathermen	documentary	which	was	released	in	2003.		In	an	interview	conducted	in	2006,	Mark	Rudd	remarked	that	the	Weathermen	“didn’t	even	try	to	keep	the	organization	together”	at	the	end.	They	“were	a	part	of	the	problem,	not	the	solution.”144	The	end	of	the	Weather	Underground	was	a	gradual	and	steady	decline.	It	had	fizzled	out	rather	than	coming	to	a	cumulative	climax.	By	1980,	most	members	had	come	out	of	hiding,	although	a	few	still	remain	underground	to	this	day.	Regardless	of	this	fact,	the	organization	had	come	to	an	end.	The	Weather	Underground	Organization	was	no	more.	After	the	Vietnam	Conflict	concluded	in	1975,	the	Weathermen	were	outdated.	Even	though	there	were	other	battles	to	be	waged,	such	as	the	prison	movement	and	anti-racism,	Vietnam	had	been	their	fuel	since	SDS.	Without	this	major	problem,	the	group	did	not	have	the	same	effect	on	the	public	as	they	once	had.	By	1975,	Americans	had	gotten	used	to	the	Weathermen’s	symbolic	bombings,	knowing	there	was	no	risk	to	their	life.	Other	violent	revolutionary	groups	emerged	in	the	1970s	as	well,	such	as	the	SLA	and	the	RATF,	who	conducted	many	bombings	stretching	into	the	1980s,	disregarding	human	life	along	the	way.	In	a	way,	these	groups	discredited	the	Weathermen,	who	were	tame	in	comparison.	The	Weathermen	no	longer	seemed	to	serve	the	same	purpose	in	a	post-Vietnam	Conflict	America.	Even	without	the	Weathermen,	the	underground	notably	
                                               144	Sina	Rahmani.	"Anti-imperialism	and	Its	Discontents:	An	Interview	with	Mark	Rudd,	Founding	Member	of	the	Weather	Underground."	Radical	History	Review	no.	95	(Spring	2006):	115-127.	America:	History	&	Life,	EBSCOhost	(accessed	May	9,	2017),	123.	
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continued	on.	The	underground	press	and	other	revolutionary	and	Leftist	groups	continued	to	act.	The	Weather	Underground’s	absence,	however,	created	room	for	more	violent	and	deadly	actions	by	newer	organizations	that	echoed	the	symbolic	violence	of	Weathermen.			 	
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CONCLUSION	
By	1980,	Weathermen	activities	had	subsided	and	many	groups	along	with	them	began	to	fade	out	of	the	public	eye.	The	Vietnam	Conflict	had	been	over	for	half	of	a	decade.	Ronald	Reagan	was	running	for	president	and	had	heavy	support.	Those	who	began	participating	in	protests	and	the	counterculture	in	the	mid-1960s	were	now	mostly	middle-aged	 adults	 and	 needed	 a	way	 of	 supporting	 themselves	 (and	often	 their	 families).	 A	 new	 generation	 was	 growing	 up	 in	 an	 American	 society	without	the	same	type	of	political	unrest	as	their	parents	had,	at	least	on	the	surface.	It	was	as	if	the	Weathermen	had	never	existed.	Even	when	buildings	were	still	in	the	process	of	repair	from	the	group’s	bombings,	however,	the	name	of	the	Weathermen	had	faded	out	of	the	memories	of	the	American	citizens	by	1980.	Political	and	cultural	upheaval	seemed	to	have	gone	silent.	This	seemingly	natural	return	to	a	capitalist	status	quo	raises	the	question	of	whether	the	Weathermen	made	any	lasting	impact	on	America,	and	 if	 they	did,	what	was	that	 impact	and	how	has	 it	 influenced	post-Vietnam	Conflict	America?	
Over	 the	 course	 of	 almost	 a	 decade,	 the	 Weathermen	 remained	 resilient,	constantly	 jumping	 over	 the	many	 barriers	 that	 inevitably	 faced	 them,	 until	 their	disintegration.	Those	who	participated	in	the	Weathermen	bombings	were	doing	so	in	the	belief	that	their	actions	could	change	America,	and	even	the	world.	That	alone	gives	their	actions	some	value	because	of	the	sheer	effort	and	dedication	that	they	had.		 Today,	 the	Weathermen	stand	as	a	symbol	of	 the	power	of	political	protest.	They	may	not	have	been	able	to	overthrow	the	government	of	the	United	States,	but	
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they	are	a	strong	example	of	the	kinds	of	messages	even	the	smallest	of	groups	can	send	 to	 a	 political	 body	 that	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	 all-powerful.	 Through	 their	 use	 of	symbolism	 in	 each	 bombing,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 they	 will	 remain	 a	 symbol	themselves	for	decades	to	come.	In	 addition	 to	 their	 symbolism	 of	 the	 right	 to	 and	 power	 of	 protest,	 the	Weathermen	show	the	importance	of	a	participatory	democracy	in	America.	Without	voices	 to	 speak	 out	 against	 the	wrongdoings	of	 a	 government,	 there	would	 be	 no	purpose	of	having	a	democracy.	It	can	be	argued	that	before	the	1960s,	this	strong	of	pushback	to	government	decisions	had	not	been	seen	since	draft	riots	during	the	Civil	War.	For	over	a	decade,	“the	U.S.	created	an	elaborate	environment	for	terror	in	Viet-Nam,	 and	 terrorism	 became	 the	way	 of	 the	war	 every	 day.”145	 After	 the	 Vietnam	Conflict,	due	to	push	back	for	this	very	same	reason	(the	draft),	it	can	be	argued	that	the	draft	may	never	be	used	again.	The	Weathermen	likely	played	a	role	in	securing	this,	both	as	a	part	of	SDS	and	as	a	separate	group	themselves.	Their	support	of	what	would	eventually	become	the	Twenty-Sixth	Amendment,	giving	the	right	to	vote	to	those	age	eighteen	to	twenty-one	years	old,	also	helps	to	highlight	their	lasting	impact	on	American	political	 and	 social	 culture.	The	Twenty-Sixth	Amendment,	passed	 in	March	of	1971.	The	Weather	Underground's	effectiveness	must	not	be	measured	by	whether	or	 not	 they	 were	 able	 to	 overthrow	 the	 United	 States	 Government	 and	 create	 a	communist	system	in	America.	To	assess	the	organization’s	success	in	such	a	manner	dismisses	the	very	nature	of	the	group.	They	are	idealistic	to	a	fault—and	openly	so.	
                                               145	Ayers,	Fugitive	Days,	272.	
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Their	 desire	was	 always	 to	 aim	 for	much	 loftier	 aspirations	 than	 they	 could	 ever	possibly	achieve	in	the	hopes	that	this	would	help	ignite	a	new	political	consciousness	in	 the	 working	 public	 and	 students.	 Although	 they	 did	 not	 topple	 the	 federal	government,	they	certainly	left	a	lasting	mark	on	the	American	public	consciousness.	Their	 contribution	 to	 history	 is	 symbolic,	 just	 as	 their	 work.	 When	 studying	 the	organization	and	its	accomplishments,	the	importance	almost	overwhelmingly	must	lie	in	the	Weathermen’s	symbolic	achievements,	rather	than	the	fact	that	they	did	not	successfully	create	a	communist	revolution.	This	 thesis	rests	on	the	argument	that	although	 the	 Weather	 Underground’s	 actions	 were	 violent	 and	 disruptive,	 when	studying	 them	 both	 historically	 and	 sociologically,	 they	 cannot	 be	 considered	terrorists.		The	Weather	Underground	does	not	qualify	as	a	terrorist	group	according	to	the	criteria	laid	out	in	this	study.	Terrorism	is	the	use	of	violence	or	threat	of	violence	to	induce	fear	in	non-combatant	civilians	in	order	to	promote	a	political	agenda.	Thus,	the	criteria	include	terrorism	being	a	(a)	tactic	that	is	(b)	constructed	through	actors’	own	socialization	and	uses	the	(c)	threat	of	violence	to	(d)	 induce	 fear	on	(e)	non-combatants	in	order	to	(f)	advance	a	political	agenda.	The	Weather	Underground	did	have	(a)	tactics	to	promote	their	agenda,	it	was	(b)	constructed	through	the	members	individual	 socialization,	 and	 they	 did	 (c)	use	 violence	 to	 (f)	promote	 the	 political	agenda	or	communist	revolution.	However,	the	Weather	Underground’s	goal	was	not	to	 merely	 (d)	 induce	 fear,	 nor	 did	 they	 attack	 non-combatant	 civilians.	 The	organization	may	have	planned	to	do	so	in	their	Manifesto,	and	even	tried	to	during	the	Days	 of	 Rage,	 but	 it	 ultimately	 realized	 that	 this	was	 not	going	 to	 accomplish	radical	change	in	America.	Instead,	through	the	targeting	of	those	guilty	of	injustice,	
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the	Weather	Underground	symbolically	bombed	locations	that	represented	American	capitalism	and	 imperialism.	By	not	 taking	part	 in	 criteria	explicitly	 laid	out	 in	 the	conceptualization	 of	 terrorism,	 the	 actions	 of	 Weather	 Underground	 cannot	 be	considered	 terroristic	 in	nature,	 thus,	making	the	Weathermen	uncategorizable	as	terrorists.	Nonetheless,	 if	 there	 was	 still	 merit	 to	 an	 argument	 that	 the	 Weather	Underground	was	in	fact	a	terrorist	organization,	based	upon	the	criteria	set	up	for	moral	justification	of	terroristic	acts,	the	organization	would	be	morally	justified	for	its	actions.	The	“targeting	of	 the	 innocent	violates	 the	 fundamental	moral	intuition	that	innocent	persons	ought	not	be	targets	or	victims	of	violent	physical	attack.”146	When	 you	 take	 this	 element	 away,	 moral	 justification	 is	 possible,	 therefore	 de-stigmatizing	the	Weather	Underground’s	actions	and	its	members.		The	Weathermen	must	simply	stand	as	an	example	of	how	a	counterculture	can	turn	violent	against	the	social	order	in	which	they	were	raised.	Civilian	lives	are	accounted	for	in	the	sociological	definition	of	terrorism	and	as	a	result,	their	actions	are	not,	strictly	speaking,	terrorist	in	nature.	Without	this	important	addition	to	the	definition	 of	 terrorism,	 the	 Weather	 Underground	 could	 almost	 certainly	 be	considered	a	terrorist	group;	however,	they	never	directly	targeted	innocent	civilians	and	never	directly	 intended	to	cause	 fear	 in	 the	hearts	of	 the	general	public.	Their	targets	 were	 benign,	 and	 they	 even	 warned	 residents	 of	 the	 buildings	 before	detonations	would	occur.	Their	quarrel	was	with	the	US	government	and	as	a	result,	their	 bombings	 were	 chosen	 to	 convey	 significant	 symbolic	 messages	 while	
                                               146	Corlett,	“Can	Terrorism	Be	Morally	Justified?,”	165.	
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minimizing	the	loss	of	human	life.	As	a	result,	the	Weathermen	must	be	disqualified	from	the	label	of	terrorist	group	and	recategorized	as	something	different.	Their	use	of	symbolic	bombings	remains	an	interesting	topic	of	discussion,	one	that	requires	the	conceptualization	of	a	new	term:	“symbolic	terrorism”.	This	term	could	open	the	door	 to	 a	 plethora	 of	 studies	 designed	 around	 separating	 actions	 that	 are	 indeed	terrorist	and	those	that	are	mistakenly	categorized	as	such.	When	there	is	no	harm	to	human	life	or	the	quality	of	it,	the	idea	of	violent	actions	as	terrorism	fades	away,	and	what	remains	is	a	new	enigma	of	radical	action.			
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